


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History of

ARMY PORT
and
SERVICE COMMAND



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UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
MIDDLE PACIFIC

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UNCLASSIFIED

History
of
ARMY PORT AND SERVICE COMMAND

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R E S T R I C T E D



Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr.
Commanding General, Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas & Middle
Pacific, 1943 - 1946.

Hotel Sheraton Bon Air
Augusta, Ga.

In the summer of 1943, on the eve of the assumption of the offensive in the Pacific against the Japanese, the Army Port and Service Command was organized. The new organization rapidly expanded to meet the extraordinary demands of combat operations and soon took its place as one of the most active agencies of my command. The port became one of the most active in the world. From an initial tonnage of 75000 tons per month, it was soon handling over 600000 tons monthly over its piers with a record for swift turn around of ships that frequently gave it first honors among all of the ports administered by the Army Service Forces. In addition, its administration of all Army Posts on the island of Oahu, of ports on the outlying islands in the Hawaiian group, of the trans-shipment of personnel, its assistance to the civilian community of Honolulu and to the Navy, all combined to give the Army Port and Service Command a stellar role in the conduct of the war against the Japanese.

As Commanding General of the Area during that period I leaned heavily upon this agency to execute vital policies and never once did it fail. It is therefore eminently appropriate that its activities should be made a matter of historical record.

Robert C. Richardson Jr.

Robert C. Richardson Jr.
Lieutenant-General United States Army
Commanding General Army Forces, Pacific
Ocean Areas and Middle Pacific,
1943 - 1946.

17 January 1947

RESTRIC TED



Brigadier General Roy E. Blount
Commanding General, Army Port and Service Command

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY PORT AND SERVICE COMMAND
APO 455

THE COMMANDING GENERAL

The history you are about to read is not truly a history in the self-indulgent meaning of the word, but the result of many hours, days, and years of unselfish devotion to duty of the officers and men who have served under me as Commander of the Army Port and Service Command. I would indeed be derelict in my duties as a Commander were I to preface this story without an appraisal of the manner of performance of those men who gave unstintingly of their efforts toward achieving our primary mission - that of supplying to the fighting men in the Pacific the necessary equipment and supplies essential to destroying the enemy in battle. The many important but unspectacular functions and jobs which, as Commander, I charged to the men under me, were carried through with such candid and succinct thoroughness that any evaluation of their accomplishments could never hope to reflect the great credit due them. Suffice it to say that their efforts can be used as a yardstick with which to measure the tasks which lie ahead for all men toward winning a total and ultimate peace in a troubled world.

To all officers and men of the Army Port and Service Command whose indefatigable efforts, and the results of those efforts, are written throughout these pages, my voice, as transcribed by the words written on this page, goes out to you in humble but proud thanks for making this history a memorable chapter in my life and the lives of the American and Allied peoples for whom we served.

Roy E. Blount
ROY E. BLOUNT
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Commanding

10 January 1947

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
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
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Abbreviations used in this History

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| AP&SC | Army Port and Service Command |
| ATC | Air Transport Command |
| CincPOA | Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas |
| HCPA | Headquarters, Central Pacific Area |
| HCPBC | Headquarters, Central Pacific Base Command |
| HHD | Headquarters, Hawaiian Department |
| HPOA | Headquarters, Pacific Ocean Areas |
| ISU | Italian Service Units |
| JOSCO | Joint Overseas Shipping Control Office |
| LCM | Landing Craft Medium |
| LCVP | Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel |
| LST | Landing Ship Tank |
| OMG | Office of the Military Governor |
| OCD | Office of Civilian Defense |
| POW | Prisoner of War |
| TQM | Transport Quartermaster |
| USAF MIDPAC | U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific |
| WSA | War Shipping Administration |

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P R E F A C E

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

P R E F A C E

The story of the mushroom growth of the Army Port and Service Command from a hybrid organization at its inception on 10 August 1943 as a major echelon of the Central Pacific Area, to the vast and varied field of activities which it covers today, is an impressive illustration of how the tremendous problem of supply, with its allied responsibilities of service and maintenance on a scale hitherto unprecedented, was met by the U. S. Army in World War II.

The Army Port and Service Command was organized at a time when the reorganization of the Hawaiian Department became necessary to meet adequately, the challenge which amphibious warfare in the Pacific envisioned during the early stages of the American counter-offensive against the Japanese in 1943. It was obviously desirable, that the Command echelon of the Hawaiian Department should be freed, to the greatest extent possible, from routine administrative and supply duties, so that it might concentrate on its primary mission. The solution lay in the establishment within the Department, of a major echelon, whose organization, mission and functions would be geared uniquely to a situation which did not exist anywhere else in the world. Plans for mounting Army offensives against Japanese strongholds — plans which called for receiving, staging, billeting, combat-training, equipping and finally, combat-loading hundreds of thousands of troops within the relatively limited geographical confines of the Territory of Hawaii — made it evident that a conventional type service force organization could not provide the logistical support necessary in this theater. The answer was found in the creation of the Army Port and Service Command, a line-and-staff type of organization under the command of Brigadier General (then Colonel) Roy E. Blount.

During its thirty-four month period of operations, the Army Port and Service Command handled approximately 12,000,000 tons of cargo across its thirty-one piers; 2,000,000 servicemen embarked and debarked under its supervision; it trebled the troop and tonnage capacity of the port of Honolulu; it was charged with the support of seven major assault operations on Japanese-held islands; it organized training schools to prepare its port companies, truck companies and amphibious units to accompany task forces; and it established and maintained billeting and staging areas in a vast

program to house the combat troops assembling in Hawaii. During all these preparations, it kept an ever increasing stream of men and materials moving to far-flung battlefronts and Pacific island bases; controlled its nine posts, camps and stations and, since 1944, the 12,000 prisoners of war moved into this area.

Today, the war against Japan is over and, while the need for Army Port and Service Command is still apparent, its major mission has been accomplished. The part it played in the building of the great Pacific offensives, which culminated in the eventual unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire and its occupation by Allied forces, is recorded in the following history -- a graphic testimony to the fulfilment of a gigantic task.

* * * * *

This history aims to accomplish no more than its title declares, which is to say that, although it is a record intended to be kept and referred to, its purpose is not to laud or magnify the achievements of any individual command or to portray only its successful accomplishments. Problems confronted have been presented, not by way of criticism, but as a means of refreshing memories which may become dimmed in the years of peace ahead. Should another national emergency arise, with the need for an organization with the unique characteristics of Army Port and Service Command, practical solutions may perhaps be derived from the lessons learned in the hard school of experience.

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I

ORGANIZATION

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I

Although General Order No 110, "Reorganization of Hawaiian Department", HHD, 29 July 1943 gave official birth to the Army Port and Service Command under an effective date of 10 August 1943, preliminary planning for an organization of this type had commenced almost three months earlier when Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson arrived in Honolulu, T. H. to assume command of United States Army Forces in the area.

Under General Richardson, a Board of Officers was assigned the specific mission of making a study of the organization of the Hawaiian Department and forecasting its possible development as a prospective staging area and advance base for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. This Board, consisting of five colonels (Colonel Roy E. Blount, Colonel Morrill W. Marston, Colonel Robert J. Fleming Jr., Colonel Clark L. Ruffner and Colonel Robert M. Bathurst), with Colonel Blount as chairman, made a complete and detailed inspection of all sections of the Department and, on 19 July 1943, submitted a report of their findings to General Richardson for his approval. Among recommendations made and approved, was provision for the establishment of an Army Port and Service Command to operate the Army port and sub-ports of the Hawaiian Department and to perform functions formerly handled by the Department Service Forces. The Commanding Officer of the new organization was to be designated by name as Executive to the Military Governor of Hawaii for Cargo and Passenger Control; the duties of the Command were to include:

The control of all Army port operations at the Port of Honolulu and at all subports at Territorial harbors.

Receiving all incoming water borne cargo and delivering to the chiefs of the technical services or commanders concerned at the pier, or at locations such as transit warehouses, which might be mutually agreed upon.

The responsibility at each sub-port of delivering incoming cargo and personnel to representatives of the District Commander on the pier and of receiving outgoing cargo and personnel at the pier.

The responsibility at Pacific Island bases for the delivery or receipt aboard vessel of consigned cargo and personnel.

Shipping all outgoing Army waterborne cargo which is delivered by the chiefs of the technical services and/or commanders concerned, either on the pier or at other locations such as transit warehouses, which are mutually agreed upon.

The responsibility for the receipt, movement (including the provision of the necessary transportation) and staging of incoming and outgoing units and casual personnel on Oahu.

The preparation and execution of detailed embarkation and debarkation schedules and/or troop movement tables prescribing the necessary movement of units and casual personnel between staging or billeting areas on Oahu and the Port in accordance with movement orders and directives issued by the Hawaiian Department.

The operation of the Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot, including the administration and classification, assignment, reassignment, equipping and disposition of all casual personnel.

The command of all posts, camps and stations, staging and billeting areas, on the Island of Oahu, except those under the command of a Special Staff section, such as hospitals, branch depots, post exchanges, headquarters of branch installations and air force fields, posts and installations.


The Army responsibility for internal security of the Honolulu waterfront area, including the fence around the restricted area, using personnel under its command.

The responsibility for maintenance, repair and operation of Army buildings and utilities in the Ports, in all staging and billeting areas and in posts, camps and stations on Oahu which are assigned to its command.

The responsibility for enforcement of quarantine restrictions on incoming and outgoing personnel and for medical service aboard transports assigned to its control.

Liaison with the 14th Naval District, the Pacific Fleet and the War Shipping Administration in all matters affecting

ORGANIZATION HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT



ENCLOSURE NO. I GENERAL ORDER NO. 110, DATED 29 JULY 1943.

the internal security of the waterfront within Territorial ports.

Control of all rail transportation used by the Army in the Department.

The responsibility for the operation of recreational facilities located on posts, camps or stations under the Command, except the Department recreational facilities.

On 7 August 1943, General Richardson named Colonel Blount as Commanding Officer of the new Command, his appointment effective on 10 August 1943.

A suitable location for setting up a headquarters became the new echelon's own responsibility. Space originally allotted on the second floor of the newly built Quartermaster building at Kapalama, on inspection, revealed that there was not enough room even for the initial group and, in view of the complicated activities of the Command, it was considered impractical. Other possible locations were canvassed, resulting in the selection of Sand Island, strategically situated in the Honolulu harbor. This site, formerly occupied by the Immigration authorities and, more recently as an alien Internment Center, although in a state of disrepair, was suitable for a number of reasons: it was conveniently situated to the dock areas; the former Immigration Building could be converted into an administration headquarters; alteration to some of the existing structures would provide officers' quarters and, some barracks were already erected.

From the time of its abandonment as an Internment Center, Sand Island had been completely neglected. Weeds were everywhere, slit trenches were undrained, mosquitoes were abundant and dengue fever was at its height. One of the first jobs the Command had to perform was policing of the area to remove weeds and stagnant water which acted as breeding grounds for mosquitoes. Since no personnel was available to the Headquarters Company at this time, 250 Service troops were borrowed from the Quartermaster and, although from time to time this number was reduced, these men were the mainstay of the first stages of the development of the island. They cut the weeds, drained the ditches, cleaned and rescreened the buildings, filled holes in the roads and generally performed the thousand and one

things required to bring a ghost town back to life.

The first assignment of units and personnel to the young Command was made on 10 August 1943 by HHD General Order No 120 as follows:

Army and civilian personnel on duty with Cargo and Passenger Control (OMG)

The Port and Transportation Division, including all its elements.

197th Port Company, TC.

Companies "A" and "B", 400th Port Battalion, TC.

Companies "A" and "C", 376th Port Battalion, TC.

Enlisted personnel of Transportation Corps Section, Headquarters Company, Hawaiian Department.

Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot.

Station complements at: Fort Armstrong, Fort DeRussy, Fort Hase, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks and Camp Malakole.

724th Military Police Battalion (ZI) Company "A".

As enlisted men from assigned units reported in, the existing barracks were cleaned and renovated for their use. These buildings had been used as supplementary warehouses for large quantities of tires by the Ordnance Section, with whom negotiations had to be entered into to have them removed to make room for arriving troops.

Through G-4 of the Hawaiian Department (redesignated on 14 August 1943 as the Central Pacific Area), five sedans were procured. These vehicles, until several months later, were the sole means of transportation for the Command, except for a bus service set up between Fort Shafter and Sand Island and a ferry service provided to bring civilian employees to work.

General Order No 120 also established a Headquarters Company (Provisional), its personnel to be furnished from sources within

the Hawaiian Department. It was not until the end of August 1943, however, that any personnel were received and even then it was a slow process. The lack of a complete Headquarters organization throughout the early phases of the Command's operation, proved a great handicap. All personnel, including Colonel Blount, were on Detached Service; no table of organization existed and, no definite allotment of grades and ratings had been made. In spite of requests for a T/O to assist in securing personnel, it was not until 18 January 1944, that an allotment of 32 officers, 3 warrant officers and 244 enlisted men was made to the Headquarters Company by the Central Pacific Area. As this allotment still necessitated employment of personnel on a temporary duty status, Central Pacific Area, realizing its insufficiency, requested a further increase from the War Department. This unsatisfactory situation continued however, until 13 April 1944, eight months after the Command's inception, when authority was finally received from the War Department for the activation of the 24th Major Port. The formation of this unit was to ease the strain on paper only, but nevertheless, it did provide a much needed administrative organization and a medium through which long overdue promotions could be made.

As the Command began to expand and more space was needed, projects were initiated for accomplishment by the Engineers. Due to the large area which consisted mainly of mud flats and salt marshland, construction, prior to the island being taken over by Army Port and Service Command, had been confined mainly to the area adjacent to the Internment Camp. Now, as quickly as areas could be brought to grade, installations were completed. Field officers' quarters and BOQs were built; roads were spread with coral and oiled; the inadequate electrical and telephone systems were reorganized; a landscaping program for the post was commenced; a motor pool was constructed utilizing existing buildings; and, the antiquated system of water supply by a three inch line, one of the biggest initial engineering problems, was eventually corrected by the installation of a twelve inch line from Kapalama.

Much of the new construction in the Headquarters area was done by troop labor and utilities forces. This included the Company grade officers' quarters, the Adjutant General's Building, the Post Office, the Headquarters Company Theater, the Chaplain's Office and the Red Cross Building. Owing to filling operations in some areas being of a more or less continuous nature, permanent

E S T R I C T I O N

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Headquarters building - Army Port & Service Command

E S T R I C T I O N

barracks for enlisted personnel have never been erected, most of them still living under canvas.

At the outset, it was obvious that, to meet the vastly increased amount of tonnage which would have to be handled through the port, embracing the receiving, storing, and reshipping of the large quantities of supplies and equipment, together with personnel necessary for the coming assault moves, an extensive reorganization program would have to be carried out. With plans maturing for the first great combined Army/Navy offensives in the Central Pacific, it followed that their success would depend, in no small degree, upon the manner and speed with which the new echelon could prepare itself for the job of handling cargo and personnel; carrying out the vast building program which had to be undertaken to accommodate incoming troops; activating training camps; storing supplies; and thousands of other details, while at the same time sustaining the normal flow of commercial cargo through the Honolulu port.

Even in peace time, the port load of Honolulu was large, because the Hawaiian Islands, not being self sufficient, imported from the mainland and elsewhere, virtually all food, clothing, building materials, petroleum products, etc., needed to maintain the population of the eight inhabited major islands of the group. In 1943, the demands of the local populace were increasing daily with the advent of thousands of civilian war workers imported from the mainland to work on military and naval projects.

At the time the Army Port and Service Command was created, the Honolulu port was handling an average of approximately 70,000 tons of Army cargo monthly. It was now faced with an immediate increase more than doubling this tonnage, skyrocketing in January 1944 to 475,000 tons; reaching a peak of 538,000 tons in July 1944; and maintaining an average of 470,000 tons monthly during the prosecution of the war.

In addition to Army cargo, approximately 100,000 tons of commercial cargo and 150,000 tons of Navy cargo crossed the Honolulu piers monthly under AP&SC supervision.

To handle this tonnage, it was clear that additional personnel would be needed for the future operation of the port and sub-ports and extensive rehabilitation would have to be carried out in



Front of Pier 40 showing adjacent area used for temporary storage space.

Honolulu harbor, including construction of additional piers.


The urgent need for personnel had been apparent since the Command's activation. Organization charts drawn up within the Command, assisted in establishing a workable organization with the personnel available, but requests were being made continually to CPA appealing for a T/O for a mobile port and for personnel to staff such installations as harbor craft companies, military police companies, port communications units, boat repair units, service and stevedore companies and medical units. Some of these service elements were assigned in the fall of 1943 (see unit history), but never in sufficient quantities to meet requirements. Authorization for activation of the 24th Major Port, as already stated, was not received until 13 April 1944, and even then, difficulty was experienced in securing personnel suitable for the special type of operations.

Nevertheless, in October 1943, only two months after the creation of the new Command, and, in spite of initial difficulties, Honolulu achieved first place throughout the world in its efficiency of port operations and remained among the top three ports for fifteen succeeding months, until all ports in the Central Pacific Area were consolidated.

Equally as critical as the demand for personnel was the necessity for additional pier space to berth the expected influx of shipping. It was obvious that peacetime facilities of the Honolulu harbor would be inadequate to handle the volume of wartime cargo necessary to place the Hawaiian Islands on the offensive and to build the gigantic advance base essential for the support of future Pacific operations. The initial construction by Army Engineers of Piers 39 and 40, originally a peacetime project designed to relieve the Army of high rentals for commercial docking facilities and to provide berths for four vessels, had commenced in 1942. To increase the tonnage capacity of the port, the pier construction program was now stepped up. A recommendation that the overall length of the piers be increased from 700 to 1000 feet was approved, increasing their capacity by one hundred per cent and furnishing space for eight Liberty type ships and one smaller vessel.

Engineer construction of the pier sheds, which have a combined floor space of 550,000 square feet (Pier 39: 300,000; Pier 40:

P R E S T R I C T I O N



Marginal wharf - Sand Island

250,000) was completed early in 1944. The Army Port and Service Command officially accepted responsibility for Pier 40 on 27 December 1943 and for Pier 39 on 23 July 1944. Both piers have been in constant operation since their completion and have contributed immeasurably to the intensified pier activities which expanded with each succeeding westward thrust.

Army Engineer dredges working day and night in the waters of Honolulu harbor, pumped dynamite-blasted coral rock and sand from the Kapalama Basin, widening the Reserve Channel between Sand Island and the west half of the city by two hundred feet. The channel now has a width of 600 feet, making the passage of incoming and outgoing vessels considerably less hazardous.

Additional pier space on the Sand Island side of the harbor was planned by the construction of a marginal wharf, 3600 feet in length and begun in June of 1944. Originally designed for discharge and storage of heavy materials of low combat importance such as lumber, cement, machinery, etc., this wharf could have provided berthing for an additional eight Liberty type ships, had the war in the Pacific continued. Completion of this wharfage was not effected until the end of 1945, though sections of it were used prior to that time. During the war period, it was utilized for the berthing of tugs and the docking of other vessels which could not be accommodated at other piers.

Army Port and Service Command was also responsible for the reconstruction to usable size of the pier located at Hickam Field and, on its completion on 2 November 1944, assumed responsibility for its operation. Prior to the finishing of Pier 40 in December 1943, ammunition cargoes had to be handled at Honolulu city piers. As a safety measure, approval was obtained to rebuild the pier at Hickam to accommodate two Liberty ships, with the primary object of using it only for dangerous cargoes. It was later considered by the Air Corps to be unwise to unload ammunition so close to the airfield, therefore the use of the Hickam piers was restricted to non-explosive cargo (largely airplanes) except in cases of emergency.

RESTRICTED

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RESTRICTED



Aerial View of Sand Island

Growth of Sand Island

During the existence of the Army Port and Service Command, its location at Sand Island has been developed to a large size military service installation although some structures are still needed to complete it. The initial area of 260 acres has been increased to 568 acres, through filling with coral pumped from the surrounding channel and ocean bed.

It now has, in addition to the Headquarters area, a 15,000-man laundry; a dry-cleaning plant; a fully developed utilities plant (including central facilities for utilities operations such as road repair, refrigeration maintenance, boiler repair, etc., which extend to all military installations on Oahu); an Engineer dredge basin and repair yard; a motor vehicle assembly line; a tire repair plant; almost unlimited open storage areas, as well as the wharfage area previously mentioned.

The island is connected by a neck of land to Oahu at the western end of the Honolulu channel. Adjacent to this connection on the Oahu side is Kapalama, part of the military reservation. In this area are Piers 39 and 40 and twenty-four warehouses and sheds for cold storage, subsistence and miscellaneous uses. The estimated value of the Sand Island/Kapalama structures is approximately \$13,000,000, the great bulk of which is construction effected since the war began.

All of the facilities constructed have a permanent post-war use and will endure indefinitely, except troop housing which was of theater-of-operations type and of a temporary nature. In the latter instance, extensive use of tentage existed. There remains adequate space, due to the increased size of the filled areas, for post-war construction of a sewage disposal plant for the city and county of Honolulu, modern athletic and recreational facilities permanent troop housing, officers' and non-commissioned officers' quarters, parade grounds, etc. Beyond these requirements, there is also considerable space for open storage, extension of shop facilities, warehousing, etc.

Cargo and Passenger Control

Designated by name, the Commanding Officer, Army Port and Service Command, Colonel Roy E. Blount, was appointed as Executive to the Military Governor for Cargo and Passenger Control on 13 August 1943, serving in an advisory capacity.

Initiated on 26 January 1942 under the office of the Military Governor of Hawaii, Cargo and Passenger Control was, at the time AP&SC was created, coordinating the following functions pertaining to port operations throughout the Territory of Hawaii:

Regulation of all facilities for handling bulk petroleum products.

Direction of the disposition of cargo from Army, Territorial and private piers and direction of the disposition of cargo until removed from civilian docks and wharves.

Verification of invoices for tug, barge and crane service.

Coordination of the allocation and assignment of cargo to all vessels loading at ports and harbors within the Territory of Hawaii area (in accordance with priorities established by competent civilian and governmental agencies.

Allocation and assignment of berths to all vessels at all ports in the Hawaiian area, in coordination with the Army, Navy and WSA officials.

Coordination and regulation of the allocation of all contract stevedore services to all vessels.

Keeping a Ships' Log containing all vessels entering and departing from Territorial ports, showing arrival and departure times, inward and outward cargo, and harbor shifts, if any.

Subsequent to the activation of Army Port and Service Command, the disposal of Army, Navy and civilian cargo carried on Army operated vessels came under the direct control of the Command. However, the

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

coordination of port facilities in the handling of shipments at all Territorial ports was continued by Cargo and Passenger Control throughout the war period and, until April 1946.

A large share of the equipment and personnel of the Cargo and Passenger Control Office was contributed by Castle and Cooke Terminals Limited, including the offices at Pier 9 and two company automobiles turned over for the use of the Army. Other services rendered materially aided the planning of sailing schedules and itineraries; also consultations which preceded ship repairs.

Martial law was terminated in the Territory of Hawaii on 24 October 1944 and on that date, Cargo and Passenger Control was designated as the agency for efficient utilization of available harbor facilities in the Territory of Hawaii. It was transferred from the Office of the Military Governor to the Office of Internal Security. Functions, duties and responsibilities remained the same - namely to regulate and coordinate harbor facilities throughout the Territory.

On 16 November 1945, responsibility for Cargo and Passenger Control was again transferred, this time to the Army Port and Service Command. The office was discontinued on 15 April 1946 when, with the exception of the outports of Kahului, Hilo and Port Allen, all functions of the office were officially terminated.

The successful operation of Cargo and Passenger Control throughout the war period is chiefly attributed to close coordination and cooperation between Army, Navy, Marine Corps and commercial agencies connected with activities under its supervision.


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C R E S T R I C T E D

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PASSENGERS EMBARKED AND DEBARKED UNDER AP&SC SUPERVISION
DECEMBER 1943 — DECEMBER 1945

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
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TOTAL CARGO HANDLED IN THE PORT OF HONOLULU

AUGUST 1943 — DECEMBER 1945

MEASUREMENT TONS

(UNDER CONTROL OF COMMANDING GENERAL, AP & SC AS EXECUTIVE
TO THE MILITARY GOVERNOR FOR CARGO AND PASSENGER CONTROL)



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II

1943

August — October

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II

In the fall of 1943 a series of operations was initiated by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff which, less than a year later had resulted in mastery of the Pacific.

The young Army Port and Service Command was assigned its first great task - the planning for the support of the invasion of the Gilbert Islands beginning in November 1943 - almost simultaneously with its inception as a major echelon of command. In preparing for the initial assault on Makin Island, the relatively new organization was faced with the dual mission of getting itself on its feet and at the same time supporting an amphibious operation in a type of warfare in which, in all its history, the Armed Forces of the United States had had little experience and for which no precedent existed.

For this and all succeeding operations mounted from Oahu, the following basic functions were considered to be the responsibility of the Command:

- To receive and ship the Army supplies required for the operation.
- To select, equip and train Transportation Corps personnel scheduled to participate.
- To contact all Army units participating in the assaults and to acquaint them with the services to be furnished by AP&SC.
- To screen all palletizing and crating requests.
- To establish a priority among units and to furnish logistical data and practical suggestions to inexperienced units.
- To supervise and coordinate all palletizing activities.
- To coordinate traffic control from staging areas to troop ships.

To maintain constant security of equipment and supplies.

To provide adequate facilities for billeting and training within the Hawaiian area.

To maintain the normal flow of cargo through the Honolulu port during all operational movements.

The receipt, quarantine and segregation of returning casualties.

Meantime, in support of these functions, new responsibilities were being transferred to the Command:

Staging and Billeting: On 4 October 1943, HUSAFCPA Circular No 139 assigned responsibility to the Army Port and Service Command for shelter at posts, camps and stations for all troops temporarily engaged in firing practice, field exercises or staging processing. A Staging and Billeting Division was set up to handle this task which, from October 1943 to 20 October 1945 involved the provision of accommodation for approximately 1,500,000 personnel.

Packing and Crating: On 10 October 1943, the Engineer functions for the island of Oahu relative to packing and crating, were transferred to Army Port and Service Command. This function was established as a branch of the Construction and Utilities Section to supply all materials necessary to accomplish packing, crating and palletizing for forces engaged in future task force and assault missions. Cargo crating required equipment and supplies, prefabricated boxes and crates. Dunnage and strapping materials were necessary and dimension lumber for palletizing. The fabrication of boxes was immediately commenced and was executed at two factories located at Schofield Barracks and Sand Island. This unit also acted as a central issuing point for such items as banding machines, steel strapping and waterproofing materials, cut stencils and miscellaneous packing equipment. During the period October 1943 to the end of the war in August 1945, approximately 86,000 boxes and crates of varying sizes were constructed for use by task forces in their preparations for assault moves.

Consignor of Army shipments: On 10 November 1943, the Army Port and Service Command was designated consignor of Army ship-

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ments, the Commanding Officer to be consignor of all Army units and supplies from ports within the Hawaiian area to advance bases, present and future.

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90 mm shell loaded on sled type pallets.

Support of Gilbert Islands Operation

In readying for the move on the Gilberts, assault elements of the 27th Infantry Division were billeted at Schofield Barracks and, Army Defense Battalion No 7, which was later to occupy the islands captured in the move, was also provided space for its organization and establishment at Schofield, its billeting problems being shouldered by AP&SC's Staging Section at Fort Kamehameha.

To expedite the movement of cargo and personnel, the Command made an all out demand on its facilities. Most of the transports were loaded at Pearl Harbor and, to supplement equipment available to the Navy, Army-operated piers were partially stripped of equipment; trucks and heavy duty tractors were requisitioned from the 7th and 27th Infantry Divisions; the Transportation Division of the Command was called upon for low-bed and flat-bed trucks, hi-lifts and jitneys; military police were furnished to convoy the Army and Marine troops from staging areas to piers, to maintain security and to route traffic.

Palletizing. A new phase in speeding up total war, palletizing was an important step in supply procedure for the amphibious armies which were to crash victoriously through each enemy held Pacific island base. A pallet is a wooden platform upon which containers are loaded in unit blocks - two types were used by the Command: combat and cargo pallets.

The combat pallet varied in size from 4 x 6 to 5 x 7 feet. It had runners on the bottom which were either open (sled type) or had a solid decking (toboggan type). Both the sled and toboggan type served the same purpose - the movement of cargo and supplies across beaches from landing craft to the dump areas.

The ordinary cargo pallet (commonly called a "skip") consisted of a double platform separated by stringers. Variations in size were later standardized to 4 x 5 feet.

Combat pallets, first introduced by the 7th Infantry Division at Attu, were again used for the attack on the Gilberts and thereafter for each succeeding operation. As each beach-head was established, palletized ammunition, food and supplies flowed smoothly from ship to shore, minimizing the handling required and expediting

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School for Clerks and Stenographers

Other training activities became AP&SC functions in its early infancy. On the inception date, 10 August 1943, the Command was directed by the Hawaiian Department to organize a school for the training of typists and stenographers. This school, the first to be initiated by Army Port and Service Command, had originally been planned by the Hawaiian Department in the summer of 1943, but its activation had never materialized.

A search was made for personnel with stenographical background, and five officers and thirty enlisted men were selected and interviewed with the object of obtaining a suitable instruction team. Of these men, one officer and six enlisted men were chosen, placed on Detached Service and, on 16 August, charged with the responsibility of setting up the school.

A location at Fort Hase was approved and buildings for classrooms and quarters altered to meet requirements. Many difficulties were experienced in obtaining equipment, but sixty typewriters were eventually procured from a Honolulu commercial concern; textbooks were borrowed from the Navy commercial school at Camp Catlin; desks and chairs were built; office equipment obtained and a curriculum prepared. On 5 September 1943, CPA published a circular which announced that the school would open on 27 September and invited applications from Army personnel under its command. The necessary qualifications for enrolment were: an AGCT of 105 and an excellent character reference. By 20 September, 600 applications had been received. These were screened and 65 prospective students selected for an interview, the successful applicants being placed on Detached Service to the school for a period of eighteen weeks.

One week before the school was to open, the Command was directed by CPA to organize a similar school for colored personnel, classes to commence on the same date as the school at Fort Hase. With only seven days in which to accomplish this, the same procedure was enacted. The school was established at Camp Kalihi; equipment was procured; buildings were remodelled; and, 100 applications were screened, resulting in an initial class of 20 colored students.


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On 27 September, the two schools were opened by General Richardson. The original curriculum included only two subjects, shorthand and typewriting, with emphasis on military correspondence. The school at Fort Hase was soon able to handle 100-120 students at a time, admitting a new group of 25 and graduating 20 monthly. (In spite of close supervision and selection, five usually failed the course).

During the first eleven months of operation, all personnel attached to the schools was on Detached Service, without an allotment of grades and ratings. This situation existed until August 1944 when an allotment of one officer and eight enlisted men was made, the quota today. In September 1944, after a year's activities, the school at Camp Kalihi was closed out, all colored personnel possessing the necessary qualifications having received training.

Organizations were now demanding clerks rather than stenographers and the curriculum was adjusted to include this type of instruction. Special courses were also conducted: classes for civilian employees of both AP&SC and CPBC were held; and a course at Koko Head was given for members of the Army Nurse Corps, nurses attending the regular classes also.

Due to the limited number of personnel available at Fort Hase since the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific, the school moved to Schofield Barracks in October 1945. During the war, its existence contributed greatly to the overall effort, not only through the efficient and specialized training of some 1500 Army personnel, but also by the tremendous volume of work it turned out for the Headquarters of the Command when urgency demanded the rapid production of reports, publications, etc.



Students at the Fire Fighters' School watch a demonstration by an instructor.

Fire Fighters' Training School

Established by the District Engineer of the Hawaiian Department on 9 August 1943, the Fire Fighter's Training School located at Fort Kamehameha, was transferred with other fire protection functions for the island of Oahu to the jurisdiction of Army Port and Service Command by HHD GO No 130 on 31 August 1943.

The purpose of this school was to train personnel, not only in fire fighting, but also in fire prevention methods. On being taken over by the Command, two courses of instruction were set up as follows:

A two-weeks course for regularly assigned fire fighting personnel provided instruction for 40 students on a temporary duty status. The course was divided into two phases, one week of basic fire fighter training and a week of advanced training at a later date.

The second course, occupied three days and accommodated one hundred commuting students. It was conducted for unit fire wardens and men who acted as assistants to regularly assigned fire fighting personnel. This course also trained fire fighting teams in specialized combat fire fighting methods to accompany troops moving to forward areas.

When, in July 1944, the Central Pacific Base Command was established, the Commanding General, Army Port and Service Command was made Fire Marshal for Oahu. In December 1944, in accordance with instructions received from CPBC, the Fire Fighters' Training School was expanded to include the instruction of Navy and Marine personnel. A joint Army/Navy Training School was officially opened in February 1945, continuing until the end of the war.

The curriculum of the school constantly changed to conform with more advanced methods of combating structural, aeroplane, oil fires, fires encountered in combat, etc. For instruction purposes, the School also maintained a pool of all types of Army fire trucks; seven were always available for emergency fire calls and twenty-four hour radio communication was maintained with the Honolulu Fire Department.

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During the period August 1943 to August 1945, the School operated with an instructor staff of three officers, twelve enlisted men and one civilian. Since its inception, the School has trained 3500 Army, Navy, Marine and civilian personnel in modern methods of fighting and preventing fires. Although the reduction in military personnel since the war ended has somewhat reduced operations and responsibilities of the School, approximately thirty enlisted and civilian personnel from Army installations on Oahu are still trained weekly.

The Central Pacific Base Command was terminated in October 1945, at which time the Commanding General, Army Port and Service Command was appointed Fire Marshal of U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific.

The future training curriculum of the Fire Fighters' Training School provides for three progressive phases: individual, unit and battalion. Once individuals have been instilled with the basic principles of fire fighting methods, units to which they are attached will receive further training as a whole and eventually, receive final instruction as a battalion. Through this program, it is hoped to ensure coordination of training throughout the Army fire fighting forces on Oahu.

R E S T R I C T E D

AP&SC Horticultural Branch

On 4 October 1943, HUSAFCPA Circular No 139 transferred to Army Port and Service Command the jurisdiction of the Nursery at Kapiolani Park, together with all personnel, equipment and transportation. The Command was directed to supply plants and cuttings for camouflage, erosion, dust control and landscaping purposes as requisitions required. The Nursery was placed under the control of the Construction and Utilities Branch of the Staging and Billeting Division.

Originally operated for the above purposes only, it has since developed into a large scale horticultural organization covering a varied field of activity. One of the earliest contributing factors to its growth was the landscaping program initiated as a result of construction projects on posts, camps and stations on Oahu early in 1944. Under the supervision of an officer with civilian experience in this work, a long range landscaping program was carried out. Covering prior planning, design and execution, it included many of the main buildings at Fort Shafter and Sand Island; the Carter Gate at Schofield Barracks; the Passenger Terminal at ATC; the entrance to Piers 39 and 40; and improvements to other Army posts and recreation centers. The new Tripler General Hospital is a future project.

Landscaping was also completed at many of the Army camps which sprang up almost overnight as the Hawaiian Islands were converted into an armed fortress. As these outposts were often located in bleak areas without vegetation, the planting of trees and shrubs not only improved their appearance, but also greatly increased the morale of the occupants.

In addition to its landscaping activities, the Nursery has maintained garden crews to supervise the maintenance of the work it initiated. It has supplied hospitals, officers' and enlisted men's clubs and recreation centers with approximately 1200 dozen cut flowers weekly and thousands of ornamental plants on a loan basis.

A new responsibility, the farm at Kipapa Airfield was taken over from the office of Civilian Defense by AP&SC on 16 January 1945 and the nursery was moved from Kapiolani Park to the Kipapa site.

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Greenhouse at Kipapa Nursery

P A S T I C L E



Landscaping at ATC Terminal at Hickam Field.

Operating separately from the nursery, the farm has produced thousands of pounds of vegetables, which have been distributed to Army hospitals, officers', nurses and enlisted men's messes.

When, on 1 November 1945, Construction and Utilities was created a Division of AP&SC, the Kipapa Nursery, the Farm, the Reforestation and Revegetation activities were merged and redesignated as the Horticulture Branch.

Surveys and reports made by the Revegetation Section covered rehabilitation, not only in the Hawaiian Area, but also in war-torn Pacific islands under United States control. In this connection, thousands of plants and shrubs are being supplied to the United States Commercial Company (formerly Foreign Economic Administration) for revegetation schemes in forward areas.

The cessation of hostilities has greatly increased the rehabilitation responsibilities of the Horticulture Branch. Large areas damaged by the Army must be restored to their original state; posts, camps and stations must be converted from staging and billeting areas to peacetime installations.

If War Department sanction is received, it is proposed to retain the Horticulture Branch as a permanent Army unit. In addition to the maintenance of landscaping of military posts, experimental research in hydroponics is planned. Employees of the Branch, whether Army personnel, veterans or civilians, will be trained as tradesmen in specialized schools. The farm and the nursery will be conducted along commercial lines and produce sold to Army organizations.

The Branch has operated with never more than one officer and eleven enlisted men supervising sixty civilian employees and 150 prisoners of war.

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Fumigating crews at work in an Army hospital.

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Insect and Rodent Control

Responsibility for Insect and Rodent Control for the island of Oahu was transferred to the Command on 10 October 1943 from the Engineer Department of the Central Pacific Area. Prior to this time, very little work in this field had been accomplished, operations being mainly confined to fumigation work only when necessary, with no preventative measures being taken.

Under AP&SC control, this unit grew to what is believed to be the largest and best equipped organization of pest control experts, not only in the Territory of Hawaii, but in the entire United States.

Working under the Construction and Utilities Branch, with an original civilian personnel strength of 40 men under one officer, in its first year of operations, the unit fumigated a total of 5,000,000 feet with lethal gas. Since that time, supplies of DDT have been available, cutting down on both the time element and the need for personnel.

Work undertaken, ranged in size from the treatment of entire divisions to single huts on lonely hilltops. Regardless of the size or condition of the unit requesting service, relief action was taken within twenty-four hours by crews equipped to fumigate anything from ships to warehouses. Field crews specialized in the treatment of buildings for insects, termites and other vermin, covering every section of the island.


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III

1943

November — December

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Training decks and shops at Camp Kalihi

Establishment of Port Group (Provisional)


Close on the heels of the move on the Gilberts came the assault on the Marshalls. Although the forces which liberated these islands did not embark until 20 January 1944, preparation for the move had been under way for more than three months previously.

During October, November and December of 1943, 528,319 measurement tons of incoming Army supplies and equipment, most of it destined for this operation, had arrived from the mainland. To cope with this mounting tonnage and to effectively utilize personnel assigned during November and December, the Command established on 16 November, within its own framework, a group for the overall supervision of military stevedores. This organization, a provisional unit designated the "Port Group" was composed of the following units relieved from duty with the Army Transport Division:

376th Port Battalion
Companies "A" and "B" 400th Port Battalion
197th Port Company
198th Port Company
199th Port Company
538th Port Company
539th Port Company

From its inception, the Port Group proved invaluable for control, particularly during combat loading when continuous port operations were required. In its administration, training and allocation of stevedoring personnel, it performed an exceptionally specialized mission. At its well-equipped training deck in the Kalihi Valley, thousands of officer and enlisted personnel, not only from Army units, but also from interested Navy and Marine Corps units, have been trained.

The increasing port load, coupled with arriving assault troops, made heavy demands on the Port Group. Reloading operations compressed into a much smaller space of time demanded a twenty-four hour work shift. To accomplish this, AP&SC's Transportation Division, Troop Movements Section, Construction and Utilities Section, and Task Force personnel pooled their resources.



Stevedores at Camp Kalihi learn correct method of making rope car slings.



Support of Marshall Islands Operation

The billeting problems of participating Army units again became the responsibility of the Command. The 7th Infantry Division, scheduled to take part in the initial assault on Kwajalein and already in training for some months, was billeted at Schofield Barracks. Army Defense Battalion #4, also taking part in the move, was quartered at Schofield until it relieved the assault troops after the capture of Kwajalein.

Palletizing of cargo for the Marshalls operation was centralized at Fort Kamehameha. This system proved so successful it was continued throughout the war. In this area, some 40,000 pallets were constructed between the strike against the Gilberts and the invasion of Okinawa.

Training:

Stevedoring. - Again, a unit of Army Port and Service Command, Company "B" of the 376th Port Battalion was prepared for operational employment with combat personnel. This Company, newly returned from duty at the subport of Maui was already experienced in port and stevedoring operations. However, provision had to be made, not only for training in garrison loading, but also for functioning under actual combat conditions. The assault of an island atoll required men thoroughly experienced in over-the-side loading and discharging and expertly trained in handling cargo at the beaches.

To train stevedores and materials handling equipment personnel a training deck was established at Camp Kalihi, built by the 376th Port Battalion and operated by the Port Group (Provisional). It was equipped for instruction in stevedoring, winch operation and rigging, as well as with a school for cargo spotters and checkers. Beginning with the invasion of the Marshalls, stevedores trained in this school went ashore at the early stages of each operation, performing superior service in loading and discharging supplies, handling winches and deck equipment, and ensuring a steady flow of cargo from ship to shore.

Company "B" received additional training at Camp Kalihi prior to its release to Army Defense Battalion No 4. This company (later

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An instructor demonstrating ship's stowage plan to members of TQM class.

R E S T R I C T E D

redesignated the 439th Port Company) also furnished a detachment of equipment specialists and operators to assist the 7th Infantry Division with palletizing and packing problems and was used at Pearl Harbor to assist in expediting the loading of D-day and other high priority items for shipment with combat forces. After the battle of Kwajalein, the company stayed on the island for a year and helped build it into a formidable base.

For its "superior performance of exceptionally difficult tasks" it was awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque (6 June 1945), the first unit in the area to receive this award.

TQM Training.— TQM classes were again conducted to instill into untrained personnel of combat units, the principles and practices of combat loading. Four concentrated courses of 14 days each were held to disseminate to the many Army Commands taking part in the move, a working knowledge of TQM functions, the curriculum being revised to provide problems encountered during actual operations. Guest instructors again came from the Army Transport Division of AP & SC and officers and enlisted men were enrolled as teams comprising one officer and two men. Lessons learned the hard way at Attu by the 7th Infantry Division, plus additional instruction received from the TQM School, resulted in their assault on Kwajalein being the most nearly perfect of all Pacific amphibious operations.

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
1944
January -- May

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Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson presents the one-star flag
to Brig. Gen. Roy E. Blour

IV

On 27 January 1944, War Department Special Order No 23 announced the promotion of Colonel Blount to Brigadier General with grade and date of rank from 15 January 1944.

On 2 February 1944, HUSAFCPA General Order No 27 appointed the Commanding General, Army Port and Service Command as Chief of Transportation on the Special Staff of the Commanding General, Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, in addition to his other duties. This appointment added materially to the responsibilities of the Command, placing it on a theater level in all matters of operation, supply, training and equipment which pertained to the Transportation Corps within the Central Pacific Area.

However, this direct representation on the Staff of the Theater Commander was short lived as, with the establishment of the Central Pacific Base Command as a major echelon of the Central Pacific Area on 30 June 1944, the authority delegated by CPA GO No 27 was removed. Although the Commanding General, AP&SC served as Chief of Transportation to the Commanding General, CPBC, he was no longer enabled to coordinate theater policies without resorting to lengthy command channels. With the responsibilities of the Command in relation to transportation activities, increasing with the tempo of war in the Pacific, the confusion inherent to such a situation is obvious. The principle of command and operating responsibility was violated, for the two were divided.

Due to the special character of modern military transportation, which demands unified control and continuity of operation, to ably direct and supervise the transportation functions with which he was charged, the commander of transportation services and forces should have remained as Chief of Transportation, directly responsible only to the Theater Commander.

Establishment of 24th Major Port (Oversea)

Authorization for the establishment of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Major Port (Oversea) was finally granted Army Port and Service Command by the War Department on 13 April 1944. This organization, the first of its kind in the area, was to provide a headquarters and the administrative overhead for a mobile port of embarkation or debarkation. In theory, its cargo capacity was to be limited by the number of port battalions attached, with the maximum general capacity as follows:

| | <u>Per month</u> | <u>Maximum at any one time</u> |
|-----------------|------------------|--------------------------------|
| Personnel | 50,000 | 20,000 |
| Supply (m/tons) | 300,000 | 200,000 |

Whereas on paper, such a port was expected to handle a maximum of 300,000 measurement tons per month, it is of interest to note that the 24th Major Port (Oversea) maintained an average of 470,000 tons of Army cargo monthly throughout the war and, in the month of July 1944, reached an all time high of 538,000 tons. In addition, it provided much of the personnel and equipment required to handle the approximate 150,000 tons of Navy cargo and 100,000 tons of commercial cargo handled monthly through the Honolulu port.

The authorized personnel strength of the 24th Major Port was 111 officers, 1 warrant officer and 408 enlisted men, an aggregate of 520. This complement was inadequate to fulfil its mission and the original allotment of grades and ratings was therefore also maintained and supplemented from time to time. Even so, the personnel shortage always existed, taxing the ability of those assigned in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Command.

Support of Marianas Invasion

Initial planning began for the third project - the move on the Marianas Islands (Saipan, Tinian and Guam) in March 1944. By this time the Army Port and Service Command had established itself as an authority on all phases of preparing and supporting assault moves while still maintaining the heavy flow of cargo through the port. Stevedores, both military and civilian, were still working round-the-clock shifts to cope with the continuous flow of supplies and equipment from the mainland and the movement of incoming personnel.

Assault forces taking part in the move were charged with loading their own vessels. This necessitated direct liaison between AP&SC, the participating Army Divisions (27th and 77th Infantry Divisions) and the Fifth Amphibious Force. The Command was again responsible for liaison with garrison forces, informing them of personnel allocations, embarkation schedules and changes in plans.

When details of the employment of the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions were made known, processing space, stowage space, palletizing and billeting facilities for working details were assigned to them as required at the Fort Kamehameha Staging Camp. The 27th Infantry Division, recently returned from the Gilberts and Marshalls for rehabilitation, was already billeted at Schofield Barracks in training for the Marianas move. The 77th Division (Reinforced) was quartered at Fort Hase, Pali Camp and the Kahuku Training Area. Army Garrison Force No 244 was organized and established at Fort Kamehameha. (Army Garrison Forces Nos 246 and 247, initially set up headquarters at Hickam Field, not under AP&SC jurisdiction, but staging area space was allotted them at Fort Kamehameha as required by specific units.)

Early in the preparatory stages of the operation, because of the disorganized method of submitting supply requisitions and the general lack of coordination of all packing, crating and palletizing functions, a standard operating procedure was prepared and issued by the Command. In an effort to conserve materials, all requests for packing, crating or palletizing from the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions and the garrison forces, were screened by AP&SC in an endeavor to have requisitions submitted on the basis of actual requirements instead of guesswork. As Fort Kamehameha had now proved

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376th Port Battalion troops unloading supplies at Saipan

to be the most logical location for a central palletizing point and regulating station, palletizing and storage areas were enlarged through coral fills. Five large areas, covering over 2,000,000 square feet were reserved for palletizing operations and railroad spurs and loading platforms installed to aid organizations in their combat preparations.

Lessons learned by practical experience in previous campaigns were applied by units of the Command during the preparation for the Marianas move. While its primary mission was fundamentally the same as that of previous operations, there were new ramifications. It was necessary to determine the amount of tonnage which would have to be handled in order to estimate the number of companies required in support of the landings and, for the first time, the Command was to furnish personnel to man the new amphibious vehicles. Since most of the personnel available consisted of untried recruits, an intense and thorough training program was essential.

In support of the operation, the following units were furnished and trained by AP&SC:

Headquarters, Detachment, 376th Port Battalion
198th Port Company
311th Port Company
312th Port Company
539th Port Company
538th Port Company
477th Amphibious Truck Company

Training:

Stevedoring.- The stevedoring training of port companies designated to take part in the Marianas operation was obtained through actual operations in Honolulu and other Hawaiian subports. In addition, they received a week's training at the Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center, working cargo on and off an off-shore barge; practicing beach landings pertaining to the handling of cargo from LSVPs and LCMS; and receiving instruction in cargo net climbing and swimming. Training at the Kalihi Training Deck also emphasized winch operation and rigging, many troops from related Army, Navy and Marine Corps units simultaneously receiving similar instruction under the supervision of AP&SC instructors.

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Unfortunately, the training of these port units was greatly handicapped by the fact that all port companies were required simultaneously to perform normal stevedoring duties at the Honolulu and outer island harbors. There was no specialized training given in bivouac or perimeter defense and other military training was not up to the desired standard. However, all companies were given final inspections to determine the status of their training and deficiencies noted were corrected, if possible.

The 311th and 539th Port Companies were later awarded the coveted Presidential Citation "for outstanding performance in combat during the seizure of the islands of Saipan and Tinian from 15 June to 1 August 1944." The first Transportation Corps units in any theater of war to receive this distinction, these companies, composed of colored personnel, were attached to the Fourth Marine Division (Reinforced) during the Marianas operation. Their performance was the more creditable as the 539th Port Company had neither officers nor men with any previous civilian stevedoring experience. The 311th Port Company was termed "green" having had only slight experience and, prior to this assignment, had been on only one Liberty type vessel.

TQM Training. - In February 1944, the growing need for trained TQMs made it advisable to place the TQM School on a more permanent basis. A more suitable location was made available at Fort DeRussy, where an empty mess hall was secured for use as a practical work room and lecture hall. Billets for thirty teams were provided and a mess hall opened for students. An officer and one enlisted man were placed on Detached Service to assist with administration. After the assault troops destined for the Marshalls had sailed from Oahu, the facilities of the school had been made available to the 33rd and 38th Divisions stationed here temporarily to become acclimated to the tropical weather they would encounter in the South Pacific. These two divisions were indoctrinated with the principles of combat loading prior to leaving for forward area mounting points.

In April, an Engineer officer of the famed 7th Infantry Division was transferred to AP&SC as Chief of the Transport Quartermaster Section, with additional duty as Commandant of the TQM School. His assistant Transport Quartermaster was detailed as the School's chief instructor. On the basis of past operations and, in order to ensure

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
efficient and effective loading of ships by moving units, it was now decided to assign a Transport Quartermaster to each vessel. Surveys made among combat units scheduled to participate in the invasion, disclosed that only the 27th Infantry Division had trained and qualified TQMs and, naturally, objected to losing them. To groom new officers from the 77th Division, teams of one officer and two non-commissioned officers were sent to the School for intensive training in combat loading. Nine courses were conducted, practical work keynoting both types of instruction. School problems were based on results of previous operations in the Pacific; lectures, training films and talks by combat experienced TQMs supplemented the practical work. A total of 275 TQM teams were trained in preparation for the move during the six weeks prior to embarkation.

Amphibious Training. - Charged with the new responsibility of furnishing trained amphibious truck companies to support assault moves, the Army Port and Service Command initiated a training program preparatory to employment of such units in this and succeeding operations.

On 7 February 1944, three amphibious truck companies (DUKW companies) had been assigned to the Command. These strange, new vehicles, officially called DUKWs (in the manufacturers' code system "D" stands for the year 1942; "U" for Utility; "K" for front wheel drive; and "W" for two rear driving axles) had been turned down at one time or another by officers with authority but lacking a knowledge of the need for such equipment in amphibious island invasion. The DUKWs had survived this treatment however, due to the efforts of three civilians of the Office of Research and Scientific Development, one of whom, British-born Denis Puleston, later spent some months in Hawaii, supervising the training under AP&SC of the amphibious units manning these craft.

A center to provide amphibious training had already been established by CPA at Waianae and an area at Waimanalo had been designated for the future schooling of amphibious units. Originally operated by the Combat Training Command under CPA, both these areas were used by, and later coordinated under AP&SC for the training of practically all operators of assigned DUKW companies and also the combat personnel involved. In this connection, artillery units of participating combat divisions, also passed through Waimanalo for special instruction, it having been established that, under reasonably calm conditions, it was possible for artillery to fire from the

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Members of the 477th Amphibious Truck Company unloading shells
after the landing at Saipan.

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A DUKW from the 477th Amphibious Truck Company
landing from an LST at Saipan.

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DUKWs when making a landing.

Of the three assigned amphibious truck companies - the 477th, 480th and 481st - the 477th, formed in December 1943 from colored personnel of disbanded air base security battalions, was selected to participate in the Saipan assault. Due to the generally low intelligence quotient of its personnel, two thirds of which had eventually to be transferred to organizations within the Command with less specialized missions to perform, it presented an especially difficult training problem. Replacements had to be drawn from personnel of other colored units in AP&SC which could supply men possessing mechanical aptitude and other requisite qualifications. The usual reasons for the exchange of personnel were that the men lacked mechanical knowledge, were unable to learn to swim, possessed physical defects which precluded their assignment in a combat organization or were essentially malingerers.

An intensified training program was initiated for the 477th Company, the unit being kept under constant supervision for the screening of personnel unsuited to take part in an amphibious operation. At Waimanalo, beach landings were practiced and cargo net climbing and swimming instruction were included in the curriculum. The compulsory swimming course proved invaluable in the actual assault, many serious accidents being averted because men had enough confidence to throw themselves into the water out of danger. Expediencies in special relation to DUKWs were put into practice: a propellor housing was devised to prevent damage in crossing treacherous reefs such as those found on Saipan; it was also established that at least ten rope fenders were needed for the operation of each DUKW; and, efforts were made to make each member of a DUKW team a qualified driver. A special course in welding was also conducted for eighteen men from the Company.

Despite all the problems encountered during its training and in the landing at Saipan, the 477th Amphibious Truck Company performed one of the most successful operations made by DUKW companies under the Command. In the initial assault, when the Coast Guard were unable to locate a break through the reef to permit entry of the landing craft, a reconnaissance made by the DUKW Company, assisted in guiding the invasion fleet through the treacherous channels. During the entire operation, due to the shortage of transportation, the amphibious vehicles serviced the 2nd and 24th Marine

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Divisions and the 27th Division from ship to shore, operating from the ships right up to the ammunition dumps and gun emplacements and losing only three of the thirty-six DUKWs comprising the company.

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
TQM Regulating Office

To assist Transport Quartermasters in loading for assault moves a TQM Regulating Office, for controlling the flow of cargo to the ship's side, was now established for major echelon headquarters of participating forces.

Situated on Pier 9, it was convenient to the offices of the Director of Cargo and Passenger Control, the Port Director and the War Shipping Administration, all located in the Aloha Tower. It was also close enough to maintain liaison with, but separate from the turmoil of Piers 24, 39 and 40, where most of the loading was taking place. This office, during this and future operational moves, was able to eliminate congestion of traffic in the waterfront area.

It maintained complete and close liaison with TQM forces of all Navy, Marine and Army units; CincPOA Transportation Office; Port Director, Coast Guard Commander; Cargo and Passenger Control; War Shipping Administration; Joint Advisory Shipping Committee; G-4 and G-5, POA; and, Freight Office Operations, Pearl Harbor.

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New Camps and Training Areas

Additional Engineer functions were made the responsibility of the Command on 27 May 1944. HCPA General Order No.165 designated the following camps and training areas as subposts of posts and camps already assigned to Army Port and Service Command:

Fort Hase: Unit Jungle Training Center
Heeia Camp
Pali Camp
Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center
Iolakaa Valley Training Area

Fort Ruger:
Koko Head Camp (Amphibious & Medical)
Wailupe Impact Area
Marconi Impact Area

Camp Malakole:
Waianae Amphibious Training Center
Makua Area
Little Schofield Camp
Kahe Point Training Area
Maile Landing Beach

Fort Kamehameha:
Aiea Staging Area

Schofield Barracks:
Kaiaka LVT Camp
Puuiki Training Area
Moluleia Training Area
Kawaihoa Training Area
Eucalyptus Forest Training Area
Kahuku Camp

The maintenance of these areas was greatly increased by the fact that they were mainly used by transient personnel in training for short periods only.

~~P E S T R I C T E D~~

Non-commissioned Officers' School

To provide refresher courses in military subjects for non-commissioned officer personnel of the Command, a non-commissioned officer school was established by HAP&SC Circular No 66 on 16 May 1944.

The mission of this school was to develop the military knowledge and active cooperation of non-commissioned officers; to eliminate the constant tendency towards relaxation often brought about by assignments removing them from strict military supervision and discipline; and, to maintain the high standards of performance demanded by the Command.

The first class was held on 29 May 1944 in a small, temporary building at Fort Shafter, with an AP&SC officer acting as instructor. This class was of two weeks duration and included twenty students, the curriculum based on the fundamentals of basic military training.

A new location at Fort Ruger had been found for the school by the time the students for the second class had been allotted. Here, facilities were much improved and included an office, supply room, barracks, one large classroom and a projection room where training films could be shown. Two capable students, recruited from the first class, formed an addition to the instructor personnel. Examinations conducted during the class were a basis for the student's grade, which was sent to his Commanding Officer at the end of the course.

On 16 October 1944, the school was enlarged to accommodate forty students instead of twenty-five and the length of the course was extended from two weeks to one month. The course of instruction was also broadened to include additional subjects and a weekly examination and grading system was initiated. The school moved to Fort Hase in February 1945, which site provided more suitable housing and training areas than Fort Ruger. With a number of ranges and training areas adjacent to the post, new military training subjects could be, and were added to the curriculum. In the majority of subjects, half the time allotted was devoted to classroom work and the other half to practical application.


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To accomplish the mission of the school, the strictest discipline was maintained at all times. Personal and barracks inspections were held daily and full dress and field inspections were scheduled at the end of each week. In both practical and theoretical work there existed no avenue that would permit a student to coast through the school. Students were placed on a competitive, eliminating basis and, unless they were successful, they were relieved, sent back to their organizations and a full report rendered their commanding officers.

When the school closed on 20 October 1945, twenty-two classes had been held. Of 673 non-commissioned officers attending the school, 637 graduated. Graduates received the school diploma and a copy of individual grade sheets listing all grades received. All four weekly examinations and a consolidated grade sheet were sent to each student's organization.

RESTRICTED

ORGANIZATION CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND



LEGEND:

- COMMAND CHANNEL
- ADVISE, RECOMMENDATION AND COORDINATION
- - - OPERATIONAL CONTROL FOR DEFENSE ONLY

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND

Approved

H. T. Burden
H. T. Burden
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

10 NOV 1944

On 30 June 1944, HCPA General Order No 212 assigned the Army Port and Service Command to its newly established major echelon - the Central Pacific Base Command. While the mission of AP&SC under the new organization remained unchanged, this additional command channel did little to facilitate operational responsibilities. The creation of an intermediate headquarters without command authority, from an AP&SC point of view, served only to delay the execution of its policies.

AP&SC was no longer in its infancy - ten months had elapsed since its inception and the tempo and scope of its operations had multiplied enormously. Having passed through the adolescent stage it was now able to cope with new difficulties created as each operation brought forth problems not featured in previous assaults and, to function with the ease and adaptability which is born of experience.

Plans for the impending invasion of the Palau Group and the Philippines had begun in June. A strike in the Palau Group was the only assault called for, with principal targets to be the islands of Pelelui and Babelthuap. Based upon this projection, the groundwork was laid towards providing sufficient personnel and equipment to handle Army tonnage at the base intended to be established at Babelthuap. When information was passed from higher headquarters that no attack would be made on Babelthuap but that the strike would continue as planned on the other islands, the number of Transportation Corps personnel originally designated for the operation was somewhat reduced.

It was decided to send one port company of the 504th Port Battalion with the Army Division to land at Anguar and three port companies with the forces to land at Ulithi where a strike was planned twenty days after D-day at Anguar and Pelelui. In the process of loading for this move, authorization came for a strike at the island of Leyte in the Philippines archipelago.

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Support of Palau and Philippines Invasion

As a result of the change in the tactical plan, it was finally determined to assign the 290th Port Company and the 481st Amphibious Truck Company to support the operation in the Palau Group. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment of the 504th Port Battalion, the 291st, 292nd and 293d port companies, plus a detachment of the 331st Harbor Craft Company were re-scheduled to accompany the Army divisions taking part in the Leyte Island phase.

Billeting of Army divisions preparing for the assault was distributed as follows: the 81st Infantry Division (Reinforced) was assigned space for 19,700 men at Fort Hase and subposts; the 7th Infantry Division (Reinforced) and the 96th Infantry Division were provided 18,800 and 19,175 spaces respectively at Schofield Barracks; the 24th Corps was also assigned office, billeting and training facilities at Schofield (the 481st Amphibious Truck Company and 292d Port Company attached to the 24th Corps were billeted at Koko Head, Kiaka Bay, Kalihi Camp and Sand Island) quarters and facilities to accommodate 11,250 personnel being allocated; Army Garrison Force No 248 was organized with headquarters at Fort Kamehameha, with an aggregate of 8000 spaces. Processing space, stowage space, palletizing and billeting facilities for working details were assigned to all participating divisions at Fort Kamehameha for the preparation of equipment and supplies destined to move forward.

All of the task force units called on the Command for assistance in obtaining materials for palletizing, packing and crating. In order to maintain control over the distribution of materials, it was necessary for each division to select an officer to serve in the capacity of Supply Liaison Officer. It was the duty of this officer to obtain from his Division G-4, a consolidated list of packing and crating requirements for the division and attached units.

Inasmuch as operational control for the move was under the supervision of the Third Amphibious Force (Navy) and the Provisional Amphibious Corps (Marine), continuous liaison was maintained between these two headquarters and the various headquarters of Army organizations involved. AP&SC served in this capacity by keeping constantly in contact with Navy and Marine TQMs and by disseminating

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the information obtained to interested parties.

Assault forces were again charged by CincPOA with the loading of their own vessels. The experienced 7th Division required little assistance except in securing transportation for supplies and equipment. However, orientation had to be given to the 81st and 96th Divisions regarding the services which would be made available by AP&SC in the preparation and movement of cargo. The actual loading was performed by stevedores drawn from combat units, their inexperience necessitating many trained technicians being provided by the Command to serve as advisors.


AP&SC's Transportation Division also supplied high lifts and dollies to aid in loading operations. For the movement of cargo to the piers it provided 1961 freight cars of all types; for troop movements, 1611 cars; for handling both personnel and cargo, 2089 trucks. The narrow gauge Oahu railway often moved as many as 10,000 troops to the piers in a single day.

Training: The intensified training program which had characterized the Marianas operation was again set into action and agencies already experienced in preparing a task force for its mission were enlisted.

Stevedoring.-- The 504th Port Battalion, units of which had been chosen to accompany assault personnel, had already completed seven months stevedoring operations in the Pacific Ocean Area under AP&SC supervision. These units (290th, 291st and 293d Port Companies) were now given training in live hand grenade practice and weapons qualification at Schofield Barracks, in addition to carrying out their normal duties at the Honolulu port. Basic military training again had to be kept to a minimum as sufficient time was not available to meet military requirements.

All port units, including the Medical Detachment, were sent to the Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center for a period of three days. Here, they took part in amphibious training which included beach landing operations, the use of debarkation nets, organization of boat teams, special training in first aid, sanitation and evacuation. Instruction in splicing, deck and ship nomenclature, winch operation and the use of stevedoring equipment, was also given to many small teams of Navy and Marine personnel at Kalihi Training Deck.

R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

Members of a TQM Team study diagrams of the correct loading of a ship.

When their training was completed, the 290th Port Company was attached to the 1138th Engineer Combat Group of the 81st Division to assist in unloading operations in the Palau assault. For the operation at Leyte, the 291st Port Company was attached to the 7th Infantry Division; the 292d to the 24th Corps; and the 293d to the 96th Infantry Division. Personnel of these units were used to form working parties on assault ships and, after the vessels had been discharged, to assist on shore.

TQM Training.- In June, the Transport Quartermaster School had again moved its headquarters, this time to a permanent location in the Japanese Jodo Temple in Honolulu City. Here, an excellent classroom was available with improved billeting and messing facilities for students.

The school curriculum now embraced three distinct phases of training: an orientation course designed for staff officers and supply officers, explaining TQM activities and related problems; an assault course for TQM teams actually loading ships; and a garrison course stressing the principles of commercial loading with a view to the utilization of every foot of cargo space.

Both the 96th and 81st Divisions sent teams to the school, however, the 81st Division's late arrival in Oahu for staging precluded its teams taking the regular classes. This proved unfortunate, as, although some instruction was received, considerable confusion was experienced in loading their ships and also at their destination.

The 24th Corps took full advantage of the school's facilities and this paid dividends when, with the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions, they were diverted from the assault on Palau to make the initial strike on Leyte. Though beach conditions at Leyte were considerably different from those for which preparation had been made, the unloading of cargo was expedited due to the excellent loading plans which made it possible for the TQMs to know exactly where the various types of cargo were stowed.

The 7th Division had officers who had served as TQMs in the invasion of Kwajalein and used these men to train its own TQMs, the school assisting by providing latest instructional information.

Practically all units of the garrison force preparing for the occupation of the Palau's and Leyte were schooled in the principles of garrison loading.

It was now realized that the system of drawing divisional personnel on Detached Service for TQM training was, in many cases, causing hardship to the division concerned in carrying out its tactical training without a full complement of officers. Recommendations were made by AP&SC through CPBC to CPA (redesignated "Pacific Ocean Areas" on 1 August 1944) that TQM teams of thirteen officers and fourteen enlisted men be trained for operational employment, these teams to be organized in such a manner that one team could efficiently handle the major TQM activities of a reinforced division.

When this plan was approved by POA, a T/O was established and the school was placed on a permanent basis. An experienced officer from the Fifth Amphibious Corps was secured to act as School Commandant and three 98th Division officers were chosen as instructors. As personnel were assigned by POA to the TQM teams, they were sent to the school for training in combat loading, three teams being immediately organized in readiness for employment.

Amphibious Training. - The 481st Amphibious Truck Company, assigned to AP&SC in February 1944 and selected to support the assault on Anguar in the Palau Group, had been receiving basic and amphibious training at Fort Hase and Waimanalo for the past four months. As the Marianas campaign had proved the importance of coordination between DUKWs and LSTs, joint training with Navy LSTs in the loading and discharging of cargo was included in their curriculum and an LST ramp mounted on pontoons was provided at Waimanalo as an additional training aid.

During the actual assault on Anguar Island, the 481st Amphibious Truck Company was attached to the artillery units of the 24th Corps. These units also received amphibious orientation at the Waimanalo Training Center.


The first mission of the DUKW Company during the assault, was to move the artillery batteries and ammunition from ship to shore. Operating approximately 72 DUKWs, ammunition was carried direct from the shipside to the battery position. DUKWS with "A" frames were used in the dumps to great advantage in unloading and stacking

P R I V A T E



An "A" frame mounted on a DUKW is used to lift a 4000 lb
105 mm howitzer from another DUKW.

ORGANIZATION of ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS



supplies when cranes were not available. The amphibious vehicles were also employed with conspicuous success when heavy seas made casualty evacuation impossible via LCMs, LCVPs or other landing craft. The sea-going trucks operated a shuttle service from beach to hospital ship without the loss of, or injury to a single man. Carrying twelve litter cases each, the trucks were hoisted aboard ship intact, obviating unnecessary handling of casualties and preventing accidents.

Harbor Craft Detachment.- For the first time in support of an operational move, a detachment of harbor craft personnel and equipment was supplied by AP&SC to accompany Philippines invasion troops. This unit, a detachment of the 331st Harbor Craft Company (assigned to the Command in March 1944), comprised four officers and 98 enlisted men. It was released to Army Garrison Force No 248 on 30 July 1944 with a table of equipment as follows:

- 1 medium tug, 86'
- 2 small tugs, 46'
- 1 floating crane, 60-ton capacity
- 1 floating crane, 30-ton capacity
- 8 motor launches, 40', J-boat type

It was proposed that, with their accompanying equipment, this unit would handle the berthing of ships, inter-island towing, heavy lifts and conduct a water taxi service in the Leyte harbor when the port had been secured. However, at a stop-over at Eniwetok en route, most of the harbor equipment was taken over by the Navy for higher priority uses and, when the unit arrived at its destination, it had to use whatever equipment could be made available.

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

Prisoners of War

In July of 1944, a new responsibility - the processing and control of all prisoners of war arriving in the Hawaiian Islands - was handed to the Command. Prior to this date, the custody and control of internees, enemy aliens and a few Japanese prisoners of war, had been handled by the Office of the Military Governor and, for this purpose, a Detention Camp had been set up in the Immigration Building located on Sand Island. On 1 March 1943, by order of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, all prisoners of war and internees were moved from Sand Island to the newly constructed Honouliuli Alien Internment Camp (later designated as Compound No 6).

With the establishment of CPBC on 1 July 1944, the control of all prisoners of war was delegated as an additional duty of the Army Port and Service Command. Initial steps towards the formation of a Prisoner of War Base Camp were taken on 11 July 1944, when CPBC placed eighteen officers and 52 enlisted men on Detached Service to AP&SC to establish an organization to handle the administration, processing, security, supply, housing and transportation functions for all prisoners of war, both in the area and arriving from the mainland and Pacific battlefronts.

By 16 July, when the Prisoner of War Base Camp (Provisional) was established as a sub-division of the Command, the above personnel had instituted a headquarters in the office of the Immigration Station in Honolulu; assumed custody and control of all internees and prisoners at the Alien Internment Camp (some 467 Japanese and Korean prisoners taken in the Gilberts and Marshalls campaigns, and 225 enemy aliens); and had activated a new prisoner of war compound (Compound No 1) near Schofield Barracks. When the first large contingent of prisoners (1000 Italians) arrived from the mainland on 20 July 1944, this area was ready for their reception.

At this time the war was in full progress on both fronts and enemy captives were therefore very closely guarded with a ratio of about one guard to every ten prisoners. The general policy was to have one MP Escort Guard Company (3 officers and 135 enlisted men) for each 1000 prisoners. Five of these companies, specially trained for prisoner of war guard duty, and one MP Processing Company, were assigned by CPBC to AP&SC in August and September of 1944 and two additional MP companies in August of 1945. As the tide of war in

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the Pacific turned in our favor, security changed accordingly and the close guarding of prisoners was somewhat relaxed to conserve manpower. Of the 16,943 prisoners of war and internees handled at one time or another in the Hawaiian Islands, only two or three instances of escape occurred, these men being quickly recaptured.

To accommodate the 11,351 prisoners of war held in the Islands since July 1944, ten compounds were activated and constructed on Oahu and three on other islands of the Hawaiian Group. Six of these areas were used for Italian prisoners, the remainder accommodating Japanese. The Prisoner of War Base Camp issued a 140-page compilation as a guide to respective compound commanders in their operation of compounds, in accordance with Geneva Convention regulations and covering all normal problems which might arise.

Prisoners requiring hospitalization received medical care at the 219th General Hospital at Schofield Barracks where a separate section was set up, wards being wired off by a man-proof fence and guard posts manned. Security measures were identical with those in the compounds.

In the utilization of prisoner of war labor, an outstanding contribution was made to the war effort. By planned allotment of prisoners to work groups, the critical manpower shortage which existed in the Territory was greatly relieved and thousands of United States troops thereby displaced were made available for assignment in forward areas. However, the administration and employment of prisoners of war held in custody, required, on the part of those immediately concerned with the problem, a special understanding of the factors involved.

In the case of Italian prisoners of war, at the time of the arrival of the first contingent, Italy's transformation from an enemy to a co-belligerent had very much complicated their status. When Italy withdrew from the Axis in September 1943, there were approximately 50,000 prisoners in the United States, most of them having been captured in North Africa by the British and turned over to American custody. A month after the Armistice in Italy, Marshal Badoglio directed all Italian prisoners to volunteer for Italian Service Units which were being formed to aid the Allies. After careful screening to eliminate men with Fascist leanings, about

P R E S T R I C T E D



P R E S T R I C T E D

Fountain built by Italian POWs - Officers' Club, Sand Island.



36,000 were accepted for the ISU. The majority of Italian prisoners sent to the Hawaiian Islands comprised men termed as "politically dangerous" who had either refused to join the ISU; had been turned down because of their Fascist viewpoints; or were unacceptable because of insubordination, laziness, misconduct, agitation, etc. Most of these prisoners bitterly renounced as traitors, their countrymen who had joined the Service Units.

However, not all of these Italians were Fascists. Some, especially those of the peasant class, were indifferent to politics and political parties. Others were Communists or Socialists. Another group were educated, intelligent and ardently patriotic for Italy as a nation rather than as a political entity. To prevent friction between individuals and groups, the Fascists and non-Fascists and ex-Service Unit members were separated wherever possibly by placement in different companies.

While the first group of Italian prisoners awaited transportation to Hawaii from the mainland in the spring of 1944, they won themselves a reputation as troublemakers. When they learned they were being sent to Hawaii, they protested violently, claiming the Geneva Convention forbade their being sent to a "combat zone". Continued insubordination inevitably led to trouble and there were physical clashes between some prisoners and their Army guards on the West Coast. However, their attitude changed considerably when they arrived in Hawaii and found it was not under bombardment. Nevertheless, these first arrivals were always considered troublemakers and required closer surveillance than those who came later.

To the United States war effort, the 5000 Italian prisoners of war received in this area have contributed materially. Under the Geneva Convention as interpreted by the War Department, an enlisted prisoner of war is paid 10¢ per day as a basic allowance, plus 80¢ for each 8-hour workday, all payable in canteen coupons or held in trust against his ultimate release. Officer prisoners receive the same pay of their rank in their own army.

Like Americans, Italians seem to have a natural aptitude or inventiveness which enables them to perform almost any type of work; they can do and have been used in every kind of job permitted under the Geneva Convention. While under the control of Army Port and Service Command they have been employed on essential military projects such as laundry work; mosquito and erosion control; shoe

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repair; furniture manufacture; warehousing loading and unloading; construction, including masonry, carpentry, painting; quarry work and rock crushing; salvage work; post utilities and general labor. They have also been encouraged to develop their skill in the arts and have produced many beautiful oil paintings, water colors and models in wood and metal. These have been sold through the Red Cross and the proceeds absorbed by that organization.

The Japanese prisoner of war has presented an equally difficult problem. Of the 11,881 Japanese prisoners received in Hawaii, many were non-combatants used by the Japanese as laborers, but all were designated as prisoners of war. Native Japanese troops numbering 4417, together with 228 combatant Okinawans, were not kept in the islands any longer than was necessary for processing or hospitalization, but were sent to the mainland as soon as possible, it being considered unwise to keep a growing number of fighting men in this area.

To intelligently administrate the remaining mixture of Koreans, Formosans, Okinawans and Indo-Chinese, whose status in the war was so capable of misunderstanding and misinterpretation, demanded a thorough insight into the national characteristics and the racial and historical background of these individual personalities. Then too, the presence in Hawaii of more than 2500 Korean prisoners of war was of intense interest to the local Korean population (about 7000) many of whom had relatives and friends in the prisoner of war compounds. In its administration, Army Port and Service Command has had to recognize this element and, in an effort to eliminate possible fraternization, a Visitors Bureau was established early in 1945. This enabled local Koreans and Okinawans to communicate with prisoners in the compounds, under the supervision of military guards.

Taken as a whole, the Koreans proved self-reliant, willing and quick to learn almost any type of work and requests for their services far exceeded the number available. They preferred the type of work which they felt would be of most value to them after the war such as laundry work, landscaping and carpentry. Unlike the Italians, who were by nature lazy and apparently unconcerned with their present or future occupation, the Koreans insisted upon working the full 8-hour daily maximum, partly because they were industrious, mainly because they wanted the full 80¢ per day reimbursement. The Okinawans, on the other hand, were not diligent and were slow to perform assigned tasks. Many of them completely failed to understand

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why they should be classed as prisoners of war.

Japanese prisoners were used mainly in the following types of work: laundries; post utilities, including landscaping and the repair of roads, carpentry, plumbing, crating, etc.; ordnance shops for general labor; nursery, cultivating and transplanting shrubs and flowers; mess halls, for kitchen police, etc.

For the first ten months following its inception, the Prisoner of War Base Camp operated on a provisional status and without an allotment of grades and ratings, all its personnel still being on detached service. It was not until 9 May 1945, when HCPBC General Order No 153 officially established the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Prisoner of War Base Camp (assigned to AP&SC), that an allotment of five officers and twenty-one enlisted men was made, which authorization was always insufficient to meet the administrative demands coincident to the operation of the unit.

All Italian and most Korean prisoners of war were repatriated early in 1946; Japanese and Okinawans in December 1946.

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

Transportation Service

The Transportation Service was formally established on 14 August 1944 as a major echelon of Central Pacific Base Command by HCPBC General Order No 51. Designated the "Transportation Service CPBC" it was placed under the operational authority of the Commanding General, Army Port and Service Command in his capacity as Chief of Transportation to the Commanding General, Central Pacific Base Command.

The mission of this service was to administer and operate, within the limits of the personnel and equipment assigned to it, the necessary transportation for the movement of personnel and cargo under the jurisdiction of the Base Command Headquarters.

For this purpose, it was required to requisition transportation units and train them in their occupation specialty; to operate such motor pools on Oahu as were required; to maintain transportation media and provide all first and second class maintenance; to establish and operate such intransit storage points as were deemed necessary for the expeditious movement of cargo; to prepare advance plans and make recommendations covering land and rail transportation needs for areas and establishments supported logistically by Central Pacific Base Command.

To its initial strength of nine officers and twenty-two enlisted men, transportation units, not organically attached to any major echelon, were assigned. As organizations within the Central Pacific Base Command requested transportation, their requirements were determined and units allotted accordingly. From an original assignment of six companies, the unit strength had risen to forty-one companies by October 1945. These units included Quartermaster Truck companies; Quartermaster Battalion Headquarters (Mobile); Quartermaster Car Companies; Amphibious Truck Companies; and Amphibious Truck Battalion Headquarters.

When, on 20 October 1945, CPBC was discontinued, the Transportation Service, while remaining as a service element of MIDPAC, was made the official responsibility of Army Port and Service Command. To more efficiently utilize the transportation now under its control, AP&SC conducted a merger of its own Transportation Division and 400th POA Provisional TC Port Group with the Transportation Service CPBC. As a result, the Oahu Transpor-

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~



Trucks loading cargo in pier area.

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tation Service was established on 1 November 1945, its headquarters located at Sand Island. The Commanding Officer was placed on the Special Staff of the Commanding General, Army Port and Service Command as Transportation Officer.

The T/O of the new organization was set up to include twenty-three officers and nineteen enlisted men, but this total was supplemented from time to time by personnel on detached service. Assigned strength on 1 November 1945, including units, was 186 officers and 4889 enlisted men.


A Special Operations Division was set up within the Service to control all port and railroad operations of the Army on Oahu and also to operate the soldiers' shuttlebus service.

Port Operations: Previously controlled by the 400th POA Provisional TC Port Group, this covered the assignment and operation of four port battalions. Of these, one was composed entirely of Puerto Rican and Virgin Island troops brought to Hawaii early in 1945 as a unit, to relieve the stevedore situation always critical in the Honolulu port. Used mainly for stevedoring and labor purposes, although inexperienced, taken as a whole these troops proved fairly satisfactory. Some difficulties were encountered however, due to delay in their repatriation after the cessation of hostilities. They were eventually returned in April 1946.

Of the three remaining port battalions, one was composed of colored troops. Reference should be made here to their exemplary behaviour and their performance of assigned tasks under all kinds of conditions.

Rail Operations: The Rail Branch handled all rail shipments, either cargo or troop, for all branches of the Service. While actually operating rail equipment on Army installations only, it maintained liaison with the Oahu Railway and Land Company in order to provide for the haulage of Army cargo between Army installations located on Oahu Railway and Land Company right-of-ways. In order that rail facilities be available for all parts of Oahu, three sections located at Kapalama pier, Hickam Field, and Schofield Barracks, were operated. In addition to hauling cargo, the Hickam Field Section operated a 15-car passenger train which hauled approximately 11,000 civilian employees per week, to and from the Hickam Air Depot.

S U S T A I N A B I L I T Y



Rail cars loading in pier area.

S U S T A I N A B I L I T Y

Soldiers' Shuttlebus Service: This service was originally set up by the Transportation Service CPBC, to cater for freight and passengers between Fort Shafter and Fort Ruger and it has grown into an indispensable and praiseworthy institution. Conducted entirely by the 15th Quartermaster Truck Company, it operated and is still operating a fleet of buses on a network of twelve different routes, conveying military personnel free of charge to almost any part of the island of Oahu. Its thirty vehicles, converted from $1\frac{1}{2}$ and $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton Ordnance shop trucks, carried 1,165,168 passengers over 2,250,000 miles in fourteen months of operation. Civilians attached to military installations were also transported for a monthly rate of \$6.00.

The service maintains a remarkable record for both accidents and traffic violations. Only one accident for every 29,000 miles has been averaged, with no fatalities and only one arrest for each 20,000 miles. These figures compare favorably with those of most commercial transport companies. Although the service is still fully maintained, it will eventually be reduced in accordance with the demobilization of military personnel in the Hawaiian Islands.

Packing and Crating Section: An additional responsibility of the Oahu Transportation Service was the Packing and Crating Section, transferred from the Construction and Utilities Division of AP&SC in November 1945. This section controlled the packing and crating of personal effects of all officers and enlisted men stationed on Oahu.

Safety Precautions: One of the outstanding achievements in connection with transportation operations conducted by Army Port and Service Command, was the negligible number of accidents which resulted in loss of life or serious injury. With only two fatalities, vast tonnages were loaded and discharged on Honolulu piers, an amazing record, taking into consideration the large percentage of dangerous cargo such as ammunition and Chemical Warfare equipment which required special handling and rigid adherence to safety regulations.

In this connection also, AP&SC's Traffic Control section convoyed approximately 1,500,000 troops from staging areas to piers, covering thousands of truck miles, by day and by night, through all types of weather and through the pall of the Honolulu blackout, with scarcely a mishap.

Motor School

On 23 September 1944, HCPBC General Order No 100 assigned the Central Pacific Base Command Provisional Motor School located at Schofield Barracks, to Army Port and Service Command with an activation strength of five officers, one warrant officer and seventy-one enlisted men.


The actual inception of this school dates back to 1922, since which time it has been operated by various organizations and under many different names.

At the time the school was taken over by AP&SC, the curriculum embraced only two courses of study: a Motor Officers' Course and a Motor Mechanics Course.

The Motor Officers' Course was designed to train motor officers in all phases of administration necessary to supervise first and second echelon motor maintenance. The course was of fifteen days duration with a student capacity of fifty officers, qualifications being that the officer students must be Motor Officers or potential motor officers. Also included in the course was instruction in command responsibility and supervision, vital to the proper maintenance of vehicles.

The Motor Mechanics Course aimed at training enlisted personnel in the performance of first and second echelon maintenance of general purpose motor vehicles. Qualifications for the course were that applicants should be second echelon mechanics or personnel of similar potential calibre. Instruction covered a thirty-day period with a student capacity of 125 enlisted men.

Proper second echelon maintenance of the many new and intricate types of cargo handling vehicles had long been a headache, due to the lack of training facilities for the agencies involved and, in October, almost immediately upon taking over the school, AP&SC initiated a Materials Handling Equipment course with the object of providing mechanics specifically trained to perform maintenance of fork lifts and other new tractor devices. The first two courses were held only for personnel of AP&SC's Port Group, but subsequent classes trained mechanics from all technical services using this equipment. The course consisted of twelve instructional days with



Students learn the functions of a GMC 2½-ton truck motor.

a capacity of twenty-five enlisted men. Qualifications for enrollment were strict, requiring the successful completion of either a second echelon motor mechanics examination or of CPBC's Motor Mechanics' Course.

By November 1944, AP&SC had added the Drivers Selection and Training Course to the curriculum with the primary purpose of training motor officers to conduct a uniform training program within their own organizations after they themselves had successfully completed their schooling. All officers were eligible to attend this course and all Motor Officers were required to attend it. Enlisted men assigned to duty in connection with the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles were also qualified for attendance; the course covered a seven-day period, with classes of fifty officers or fifty enlisted men.

In conjunction with the Army Educational Program, USAFI, a night class in welding was also held two nights per week, with instruction and attendance being voluntary.

The school was taken out of the provisional status on 7 December 1944, when HCPBC General Order No 167 redesignated it as the Central Pacific Base Command Motor School. Strength and grades were still as allotted originally. Obtaining adequate and properly qualified personnel at this period was a constant problem. The activation strength did not provide for the Materials Handling Equipment and Drivers Selection and Training Courses which had been added to the schedule and, in order to keep pace with the expanding curriculum and classes, it became necessary to supplement assigned officers and enlisted men with detached service and temporary duty personnel whenever obtainable. In almost every case, this additional personnel required training before performing specialized duties. It became increasingly difficult to operate efficiently at enrolment capacity as temporary personnel frequently and unexpectedly returned to parent organizations without replacement; furloughs and delays in securing rotational substitutions of assigned strength further aggravated the situation. It was not until early 1945 that sufficient personnel on detached service were obtained, enabling the school to operate on a satisfactory basis.

Commencing on 1 April 1945, a Refresher Driving Course was made compulsory for every soldier on Oahu holding a driver's permit. Consisting of seven hours of instruction by traffic technicians on safe

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

driving, road courtesy and rules of the road, the course greatly aided the cutback of Army accidents and traffic violations on Oahu. Within a few months, statistics showed a 75% drop in fatal accidents involving Army vehicles and a 24% decline in vehicle collisions.

To provide a uniform training and testing system for the issuance of government vehicle operators' permits, a Drivers' Permit Course was set up in May, 1945. This course included Military Traffic Codes and Regulations; Honolulu Traffic Codes and Regulations; Eye and Reflex Examination; a practical driving test and final written examination. The course was of one day only, with classes held twice weekly and an average attendance of 35 to 40 students. In addition, the school tested an average of 75 drivers each week.

Beginning in July 1945, the school's allotment of personnel steadily decreased, its present strength being four officers, one warrant officer and 37 enlisted men. Due to the shortage of military personnel, eleven civilian instructors are also being used. With the cessation of hostilities, the curriculum has reverted to its former status: the Motor Officers' Course and the Motor Mechanics Course, which have both been redesigned for postwar training and now include most of the important features formerly covered by the Materials Handling Equipment and Drivers' Selection and Training Courses. The Drivers' Permit Course is still in operation.

The name of the school was again changed on 30 January 1946 and it is now known as the Midpac Motor School.

The School performed superior service in providing a steady flow of trained technically qualified personnel for units in the Middle Pacific Area. One of its prior functions has been to develop the highest sense of responsibility in both officers and men with regard to the continued operation of vehicles. It has awarded certificates of proficiency to 4800 officers and enlisted men. Its outstanding contribution to the war effort was officially recognized in October 1945 when it was awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque "for superior performance of exceptionally difficult tasks" for the period September 1943 to March 1945.

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~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

VI

1944
October -- December

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

Support of Iwo Jima Invasion

Initial planning for the 1945 assault on Iwo Jima (of vital importance to the air assault on Japan) began in October 1944. At that time the necessary troop requirements for the attack on 19 February 1945, were determined. Since this was to be primarily a Marine operation, very few Army units were participating, however it was decided that the Command should furnish two port companies and four DUKW companies in support of Marine forces making the landing.

Army Garrison Force No 86, the only other Army force preparing for the operation, was assigned office and billeting space at Fort Kamehameha, accommodations being provided there for its 385 officers and 5574 enlisted men. Billeting space at Fort Ruger was also supplied to the Supply Section of this force. As the Garrison Force moved in several echelons, facilities were provided as required at Fort Kamehameha and Camp Aiea for staging and work parties. A long felt need for the coordination of all billeting space, working and storage areas for the units participating in an operation was fulfilled at this time. AP&SC designated its Staging and Billeting Division as sole agent for billeting arrangements between post commanders and commanders of alerted units. This enabled the Command to maintain organized liaison with the commanders of its posts and to meet their requirements in an orderly manner.

As assault forces were again loading their own vessels under AP&SC control, and the priority of Garrison Force shipments was being established by CincPOA Transportation Priority Section, direct liaison between AP&SC, Amphibious Group II and Army Garrison Force No 86, was necessary. Acting on the suggestion of the Command, Army Garrison Force No 86 appointed a Supply Liaison Officer to represent all alerted units and to assist with all packing, crating and palletizing problems. All materials necessary to accomplish the packing, crating and palletizing of Army cargo were provided by the Command, 6000 combat pallets also being constructed for the use of the Marines.

The Commanding General, Army Port and Service Command was officially made responsible for the production and issuance of all pallets; for providing adequate palletizing areas and equipment

S T O C K



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A convoy of trucks lined up at the Transportation Regulating Station preparatory to transporting a shipment of troops to a staging area.

to all Army Task Force units embarking from the Hawaiian Area; and for technical supervision over palletizing operations by HCPBC General Order No 1, 24 October 1944. As this work had been carried out by the Command since its inception, no additional responsibilities were incurred.

The standardization of cargo pallets had for some time been the subject of intensive study by the Command. The lack of uniformity of a standard pallet had created warehousing difficulties, complicated transportation and greatly hampered effective prior planning. After careful consideration of recommendations of all the services, AP&SC decided upon the 4x5 foot skip as the one that would most nearly fit the requirements of all agencies. Recommendations made to CPBC for adoption of this standard size cargo pallet were approved. Further approval was also secured for the establishment of a pallet pool readily accessible to the Honolulu piers, where the skips could be drawn by the various technical services and to which they could be returned for necessary repairs or salvage.

Transportation Regulating Station. - To remedy the constant problem of bottlenecked piers in the initial stages of mounting an operation, a Regulating Station was now set up by the Command in the vicinity of Pier 40 for the pooling of all vehicles brought into the area. Operated by the Transportation Division, it was charged with moving troops on Oahu to and from depots and ships; supplying requests for cargo trucks; and delivering pallets stored at the Regulating Area. Geared to handle the increasing shipments of men and cargo moving through the port, the station had seven truck companies at its command, including 276 6x6 trucks; 15 10-ton luggers; 5 120-passenger vans; 1 50-passenger van; and 7 shuttle buses. In addition, requests were filled for low bed and flat bed cargo trucks. With the initiation of this station, troop movements were speeded to a high degree of efficiency, effecting an orderly control of all traffic, which previously had streamed into the docks resulting in congestion and confusion.

The transportation of all assault forces from staging areas to the piers was arranged and conducted by the Command's Traffic Control Division which maintained close liaison with the Control Division of the 14th Naval District. The Highway Branch of the Transportation Division furnished 487 cargo trucks, 104 cargo trailers and 59 lowbed trailers to haul troops and cargo to the piers.

~~G E S T R I C T E D~~

Training.- With each succeeding operation, new lessons were being learned and where possible, corrective action was taken. Observers, appointed throughout all stages of loading and during the actual assaults, were furnishing reports indicating necessary improvements and corrections that should be made. Many mistakes were rectified in the AP&SC schools, while others were handled and corrected as individual problems.

Stevedoring.- The 442d Port Company and the 592d Port Company were the port units chosen to take part in this operation. The 442d Port Company, one of the first units assigned to Army Port and Service Command, was now thoroughly experienced in handling Liberty type and similar ocean going vessels, having been employed continuously in port operations on the Honolulu piers. With only seven days notice to ready this unit for movement, an intensive course of training had to be planned under the supervision of the Port Group. Together with the 592d Port Company, assigned on 4 September 1944, training was begun at the Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center. Instruction was given in beachlanding operations; debarkation by nets; organization of boat teams; swimming qualification; rifle and small arms firing; hand grenade practice; and, the handling of cargo as related to DUKWs. Basic military requirements were again kept to a minimum. When the course was completed both units were moved to Maui for loading and were there attached to units of the Fifth Marine Division.

A third unit, the 439th Port Company, also a unit of the Command since its inception, was later dispatched to the sub-port of Hilo on the island of Hawaii, for the purpose of handling Marines returning from Iwo Jima for rehabilitation.

TQM Training.- Although few Army units were included in the invading forces, units of Army Garrison Force No 86 received training in garrison loading. A POA TQM team was assigned to assist in moving this garrison, resulting in AP&SC receiving more accurate booking information and, in turn, facilitating the mounting of its nine echelons.

As the TQM School had now developed into a permanent organization, the need had become evident for a textbook. No Army publication was available which incorporated all the doctrines and technical data needed by a Transport Quartermaster. After three months of research and evaluation of subject matter, the AP&SC TQM

Manual was published in November 1944, edited by the AP&SC Transport Quartermaster and the TQM School Instructor Staff. This publication combined all Army TQM technical data and the necessary liaison information with the Marines and the Navy and was immediately adopted as the basic text reference for the TQM school. It was also accepted by Headquarters, Pacific Ocean Areas, for all Army TQM activities and copies were sent to all major bases of amphibious operation in both the Pacific and European theaters. It is now used as one of the textbooks for logistics courses at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth.

The school had also benefited by the experience of previous operations. Its library of ships' characteristics and stowage plans now covered over five hundred vessels used in the Pacific, enabling cargo planning even before the vessel reached port. When it was disclosed to which ships TQMs would be assigned for embarkation, team members received a comprehensive and detailed review of the characteristics and stowage possibilities of their ships and direct assistance in preparing a workable plan for loading.

In December 1944, AP&SC requested the Central Pacific Base Command to direct all units leaving the island as garrison forces, to send one team consisting of an officer and two enlisted men to the school. This directive was incorporated in the CPBC POM for all unites the size of a company.

Amphibious Training. - The four amphibious truck companies furnished and trained by the Command for the assault on Iwo Jima, the 471st, 473d, 475th and 476th Amphibious Truck Companies assigned to AP&SC on 9 September 1944, were the only units of Army personnel actually participating in the land operation. Manned by inexperienced colored personnel, the training of these companies presented a problem similar to that experienced with the 477th Amphibious Truck Company furnished by the Command for the Saipan operation.


To meet the qualifications essential for service in an amphibious organization, many adjustments of original personnel were again necessary. Prior to leaving the mainland in August, at least ten men in each company had been found unsuited for combat duty and, during the training period on Oahu, over fifty men, almost all of them volunteers, were transferred to the amphibious truck companies from colored port units under AP&SC to replace unsatisfactory personnel.



A Motor Pool at the Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center

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R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

DUKW drivers receiving training driving over coral heads.

It was obvious that a rigorous and intensified training program would have to be enforced. On 15 September 1944, the Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center was placed under control of Army Port and Service Command and plans were immediately inaugurated for its complete reorganization. Formerly nothing more than a bivouac area, with only the barest facilities for housing and messing trainees, Waimanalo was converted almost overnight, into an active DUKW School with modern and efficient training equipment. The Commanding Officer of the Saipan-experienced 477th Amphibious Truck Company was brought from Saipan and placed in charge of the School; officer specialists were drawn from other units to give specific instruction; the entire camp site was remodeled and plumbing and lighting installed; five complete motor pools with grease and wash racks were constructed, 6000 2½-ton loads of coral being hauled in to hard surface these areas and sprayed with oil to keep down the dust; a floating barge with a boom was towed to Waimanalo to assist in off-shore loading exercises; and, considerable rehabilitation was completed on the pier, two new winches being installed.

With the completion of these projects, the school was reopened as the CPBC DUKW Operations and Maintenance School, operated by Army Port and Service Command. During September, October and November, five amphibious truck companies, with a total of 250 DUKWs, were trained in the new school. Among the subjects especially stressed, were training in surf and coral driving; loading and unloading artillery; and, DUKW maintenance.

The first DUKW unit to embark for Iwo Jima was the 475th Amphibious Truck Company on 30 December 1945. It was assigned to Army Garrison Force No 86, its mission being to supply cargo and equipment after the initial phase of the assault. The 471st was attached to the 13th Marines on 14 November 1944 and was utilized during the period prior to embarkation on 10 January 1945, in training with Marine units in preparation for the operation. The primary mission of this unit was to land the 3d and 4th Battalions of the 13th Marine Division and to keep them supplied with ammunition. The 473d Company was relieved from AP&SC on 1 December 1944 and attached to the 5th Amphibious Corps for operational control. It was mainly used to land priority loads on order of the Fifth Amphibious Corps. The 476th Amphibious Company was attached to the 14th Marine Regiment of the 4th Marine Division and was used for the hauling of ammunition and cargo and also to evacuate casualties.

During the assault, because of severe enemy fire, a period existed when landing craft could no longer move artillery, ammunition and water ashore. DUKWs were brought into action and in their third attempt eventually succeeded in delivering Marine field artillery, gun crews and ammunition to the beach. Evidence of the sound training received by DUKW personnel was later received from the Task Force Commander, who, in a verbal commendation during the operation, praised their skill, saying "They were doing a wonderful job taking supplies and ammunition ashore". Observers reported extraordinary performances on the part of the colored DUKW crews. Many of them worked 48-hour stretches loading and unloading ammunition in the face of extreme danger; mortar fire filled many vehicles full of holes, but drivers kept them operating until the last second before going under.

Prompted by an observer's report on DUKW operations at Iwo Jima, experts at the DUKW Operations and Maintenance School later tackled the problem of making repairs under water and under fire to vehicles sunk during ship to shore operations - an experimental under-water repair device was the result.

P R E S T R I C T E D

P R E S T R I C T E D



Personnel Center Headquarters - Fort Kamehameha

Personnel Center

Due to the ever growing number of men being shipped back to the mainland for TDR&R, Rotation, to attend Officer Candidate School, for discharge or other reasons, it soon became evident that one organization should handle all the processing details incidental to the movement of personnel in order to avoid confusion. This involved the provision of housing, mess facilities, clothing, processing of records, censoring of baggage, orientation and transportation of all Army personnel on their way homeward (excluding units).

On 5 October 1944, the Commanding General, CPBC, directed the Commanding General, AP&SC, to establish and operate the CPBC Casual Personnel Depot and all staging and administrative functions incidental thereto, and further, to have the personnel in readiness to operate the Depot by 10 October 1944.

An immediate survey by the Command to locate a suitable area for setting up this Depot, disclosed that there was in the Fort Kamehameha Staging Area, space to accommodate an organization capable of housing approximately 2000 casualties. It was determined that ten officers and seventy enlisted men would be necessary to accomplish the functions of the unit and, on 6 October, HCPBC General Order No 114 established the Casual Depot, CPBC, to be operated by Army Port and Service Command.

By mid-November, the number of men processed and dispatched by the Casual Depot had reached the 4000 mark. It continued to climb, an average of approximately 3200 men monthly being maintained for the next six months. By May 1945, with the end of the war in the European Theater, it was obvious that the Casual Depot would soon become one of the key installations in the area. Previously, the Depot had been employed to handle the reception and disposition of all individuals in transit; now, the procedure also involved their separation from the service.

Organization of mainland personnel centers was followed in the reorganization of the Casual Depot and, on 14 May 1945, the 404th POA Provisional Personnel Center was officially established, operated by AP&SC and made up of the following units: 405th POA Provisional Reception Station; 406th POA Provisional Disposition

~~RESTRIC TED~~

Center; and 407th POA Provisional Separation Center. Although the Casual Depot still existed nominally, its duties had been taken over by the Reception Station.

Personnel was now increased to twenty-two officers, one warrant officer and 103 enlisted men. Barracks replaced tents; post exchange, barber and laundry facilities were expanded; and, additional personnel were provided to enlarge the Information and Education Special Service activities. Individuals could now be processed in forty-eight hours and block groups were set up to utilize all available shipping space.

By June, with the announcement of the readjustment program releasing 85-point enlisted men, the Center was set up to process a load of 500 men per day. Its expansion had been tremendous. Averaging over 5000 men per month, it was apparent that the installation would have to be taken out of the provisional status. On 18 July 1945, the old organization was again changed to the following units: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, CPBC, Personnel Center; CPBC Reception Station; CPBC Disposition Center; CPBC Separation Center; all to be operated under AP&SC.

Upon the capitulation of Japan in August 1945, the CPBC Personnel Center took on added importance. It was given top priority on personnel and construction. Its personnel allotment swelled to 75 officers and 500 enlisted men.

However, the unexpected and quick surrender of the enemy found the Center only partially prepared to handle the immediate redeployment of thousands of service personnel falling within the critical score announcement of 85 points. Working feverishly, day and night, the Center successfully hurdled the first uncertain days, but on 5 September, in order to streamline command channels and to increase the allotment of personnel, the Personnel Center was made a major echelon of Central Pacific Base Command, with an organization strength of 93 officers and 703 enlisted men.

During the eleven-month period of AP&SC supervision, the Center processed approximately 60,000 officers and men, 37,000 of this total being handled between May and September 1945.

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TC Journal

For the information of those concerned with Transportation Corps activities in the Pacific Ocean Areas, Army Port and Service Command now commenced the twice-monthly publication of a booklet to be distributed to all interested agencies. Under the title of the "Transportation Corps News Letter" the first issue made its appearance on 1 November 1944.

Besides providing information regarding current activities and developments in the field of transportation, this publication invited readers to supply material for future issues, creating a medium for the exchange of new ideas and the reevaluation of old ones by its operation as an editorial bulletin board.

Within two months, a new feature - a photo supplement - was added and, with its introduction on 15 January 1945, the "News Letter" became the "TC Journal".

Throughout the succeeding ten months, the TC Journal was widely distributed, disseminating interesting and informative facts and ideas to Army agencies scattered through the Pacific.

With the unexpected surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, and the consequent curtailment of Transportation Corps activities, the issue of the TC Journal was discontinued on 15 October before its first anniversary could be observed. Much of the material gathered for publication in previous issues had originated in forward battle zones where highlights of the Transportation Corps as regards specialized training, TC equipment, etc., were sighted and subsequently published and now, with the cessation of hostilities, this source of copy no longer existed.

Throughout the entire period of its publication, the favorable reception of the TC Journal was reflected in the numerous complimentary communications received from various organizations, including ports of embarkation and the Chief of Transportation's Office in Washington. Material from its pages was many times requested for reproduction in the Army Transportation Journal as a means of publicizing the accomplishments of the Transportation Corps in the Pacific.

RESTRICTED



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AP&SC Apiary -- Fort Shafter

AP&SC Apiary

When the problem of revegetating combat scarred islands was first discussed in the fall of 1944, it was suggested by Army Port and Service Command that an apiary be established in order that colonies of bees might be transferred to devastated areas to assist in pollination.

This project was eventually initiated under authority of approval given by Central Pacific Base Command on 30 November 1944. An initial allocation of \$600.00 was granted and on 10 January 1945 the apiary site was established at Fort Shafter with eight colonies. This number was augmented in February 1945 by the purchase of twenty-five additional colonies and was later increased to fifty.

The unusually dry season in 1945, together with the shortage of supplies existing in the apiary's early development, reduced the expected honey crop in the first year to about five hundred pounds, but an output of approximately two tons yearly is anticipated.

Colonies have already been sent to Guam and Iwo Jima and more will be distributed as Pacific revegetation plans mature.

Operated under the jurisdiction of the Construction and Utilities Division, the Apiary maintains one enlisted man thoroughly trained in beekeeping.

~~B E S T R I C T E D~~

Repairs and Utilities

Under authority of HCPBC Administrative Order No 1, 28 December 1944, the Commanding General, AP&SC was delegated the power to accomplish repairs and utilities work not exceeding \$5000 for any one project.

The scope of this work included all installations on Oahu not specifically assigned to any other command. The use of civilian employees to augment occupying troops was also authorized, if necessary.

~~B E S T R I C T E D~~

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

VII

1945
January — May

~~RESTRICED~~

Support of Okinawa Invasion

With the fall of Iwo Jima, the road to Tokyo seemed at last clearly defined. The great cities of the Japanese homeland were now being blasted by American superfortresses on an ever increasing scale. It was certain that the island-hopping, which had characterized earlier Pacific operations, would soon give place to an invasion of Japan itself. The assault on Okinawa opening in April 1945, was to bring this objective within easy reach. Cargo was moving faster than ever before, with stevedores working two 10-hour shifts, seven days a week. The Port of Honolulu was producing a total volume of work 49% heavier than the average mainland port, with 22% of the personnel.

The allocation of officer and troop space had commenced in September of 1944 when AP&SC's Billeting and Staging Division had established 10th Army and 9th Corps Headquarters at Schofield Barracks along with part of the 24th Corps which had been operating from that post prior to this particular move. Space for Army Garrison Forces No 245 and No 331, together with storage space for equipment and supplies ready for shipment, was allocated at Fort Kamehameha and additional space made available for a headquarters at Schofield Barracks. In addition, facilities to accommodate approximately 64,000 troops were allocated for units preparing to move forward.

Again, Army Port and Service Command maintained liaison with the 10th Army, the Navy, Marines, JOSCO, Cargo and Passenger Control, before each echelon commenced loading. Since Army troops outnumbered Navy and Marines to be embarked, the Troop Movement Division of the Command prepared all embarkation plans.


Packing and crating materials necessary in packaging impedimenta and equipment for all units engaged in the operation were supplied by the Construction and Utilities Branch, 4000 pallets also being built for the Navy and the Marines.

To haul cargo and troops to piers, 409 rail cars and 2008 trucks with trailers were controlled by the Command, these services being facilitated by the newly established Regulating Office.

In support of the Okinawa operation, the largest yet to mount for a Pacific assault, though the main assault troops did not load

ORGANIZATION

ARMY PORT AND SERVICE COMMAND



LEGEND:

- COMMAND CHANNEL
- - - ADVICE, RECOMMENDATION, AND COORDINATION

Ray E. Baur
Approved:
RAY E. BOUR
Brigadier General U.S. Army
Commanding

1 MARCH 1945

from Oahu, the following units were furnished by AP&SC:

Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 53d Medium Port, TC.
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 363d Port Battalion
200th, 201st, 203d, 204th, 206th Port Companies.
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 504th Port Battalion
290th, 291st, 292d, 293d Port Companies.
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 116th Port Battalion.
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 364th Port Battalion.
3239th, 4207th, 4217th, 4345th Quartermaster Service Companies.
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 474th Quartermaster
Truck Battalion (Mobile), 3754th, 3761st, 3762d Quarter-
master Truck Companies.
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 23d Amphibious Truck
Battalion
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 42d Amphibious Truck
Battalion
474th, 477th, 481st Amphibious Truck Companies.

Activation of 53d Medium Port.— The activation of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 53d Medium Port, TC, to accompany assault force personnel and set up a port organization at Okinawa, had first been discussed with CPBC in October of 1944. At that time, AP&SC had found it impossible to furnish personnel for such an activation and had recommended that, the key personnel at least, be requisitioned from the mainland by the War Department.

Early in January 1945, communications were again received from CPBC requesting concurrence and comments on the proposed activation of a Medium Port by Army Port and Service Command, including the furnishing of some of the personnel for such a unit. AP&SC's answer was to the effect that, a Medium Port could be activated and that the Command would contribute its share of equipment and personnel. As a result, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 53d Medium Port, TC, was activated by CPBC General Order No 40, 24 January 1945, assigned to AP&SC with a personnel strength of 76 officers and 100 enlisted men.

The first Medium Port to be organized in this area, most of its personnel came from units under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, POA, with a few key officers drawn by War Department orders, from West Coast ports of embarkation. One of the earliest problems encountered in preparing the 53d Medium Port

for its mission was getting the personnel assigned and on the job. Actually, when the organization received its movement orders on 12 February 1945, only 32% of the officers and 43% of the enlisted men had reported for duty. A suitable site for a headquarters was located at Fort DeRussy and as soon as enough personnel were available, the tremendous job of training began. The little time available was put to good effect and as soon as each man reported in he was put to work with an individual in his corresponding job in the 24th Major Port of AP&SC. All available publications relative to port operations were distributed among personnel. The entire organization, less the necessary guard detail, went on a three day bivouac designed to acclimate all personnel to living under field conditions and to complete the required training.

This unit was relieved from AP&SC on 25 February 1945 and assigned to the 10th Army, embarking with all personnel and equipment on 27 March for Okinawa. Although two field grade officers were sent from AP&SC to accompany the 53d Medium Port on its mission, to aid key personnel in its early establishment, it was many months before a successful port operation at Okinawa was achieved. This was attributed to a lack of coordination among personnel and the resultant effects on the unified effort.

Training:

Stevedoring.- The port companies selected for this operation needed little stevedore training having had twelve months or more experience in port operations under AP&SC supervision. However, additional instruction was given them at the Kalihi Training Deck which was in constant use during the preparatory stages of the move. At the same time, groups of Navy and Marine Corps personnel were again given general stevedoring training under Port Group supervision.

The following units, drawn from the Port Group (redesignated 400th POA Provisional TC Port Group on 19 May 1945) were attached to units of the 96th, 77th and 7th Infantry Divisions for the assault landing at Okinawa:

Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 363d Port Battalion
200th, 201st, 203d, 204th, 206th Port Companies
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 504th Port Battalion
290th, 291st, 292d, 293d, Port Companies

Headquarters & headquarters Detachment, 116th Port Bn.
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 364th Port Bn.
3239th, 4207th, 4217th Quartermaster Service Companies.

The 293d, 204th, 291st, and 200th Port Companies, assigned to the 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions, were released from assignment upon completion of the unloading of their respective ships at the target and reassigned to Combat Engineer Battalions ashore as labor details. Those assigned to the 77th Infantry Division (292d and 203d) participated in further landings, the 203d eventually remaining on Ie Shima for the unloading of resupply shipping. No casualties were encountered by any of these companies in the performance of their assigned missions.

Cargo handling gear in the amount of 1597 measurement tons was issued to these port battalions by AP&SC.

Quartermaster Service & Truck Companies. - Furnished for the first time by the Command for an operational move, these companies received on-the-job training by employment in the hauling of cargo and personnel to and from the port of Honolulu. Military training was also given these units in addition to instruction in swimming, weapons qualification and vehicle maintenance. However, after the operation, it was recommended that, because of the varied assignments given Quartermaster Service Companies, training should include DUKW driving, winch operation, and the operation of bulldozers and materials handling equipment.

TQM Training. - In January 1945, at the request of AP&SC, a Naval officer was attached to the TQM School on temporary duty as an instructor. For some time it had been realized that amphibious operations required teamwork of the highest degree between the two services and it was believed that by having a Naval officer on the faculty, the inherent differences which exist in all joint operations might be clarified and the curriculum kept abreast of the latest changes in amphibious procedure. The Naval instructor was requested to instruct the prospective TQM teams in naval customs and terminology and to explain the Navy's problems in both assault and garrison loading, as well as the tentative solution.

Working with the G-3 Section of the 10th Army, the TQM School now set up courses to instruct attached Army units in combat and

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Supplies for the 10th Army being unloaded from a
JKW during the Okinawa invasion

garrison loading prior to their moving forward to a mounting point for the Okinawa assault. Units from the five garrisons set up for the eventual occupation of Okinawa also utilized the facilities of the school continuously from January through September 1945.

The 2213th POA TQM team was assigned to the 10th Army for the Okinawa operation, with headquarters at Schofield Barracks and an Operations Office in Army Port and Service Command. In effect, this Operations Office was a regulating station with the primary mission of coordinating the flow of all 10th Army troops and cargo from staging areas to piers as instructed by AP&SC. During the assault move, the TQM team system again proved very satisfactory and was recommended for all large future movements.

Amphibious Training. - Despite the immense amount of effort which had been devoted to the overall improvement of the Waimanalo area by AP&SC and the signal success attained in the conduct of the DUKW Operations and Maintenance School, it was turned back to the Combat Training Command by CPBC on 15 December 1944. Although the schedule for the training of DUKW companies could still be set up by Army Port and Service Command, the actual instruction to amphibious personnel was now given by officers of the Combat Training Command. A course was set up for the units taking part in the move, special emphasis being placed on training for operations over coral reefs and in high surf; a refresher course in swimming and weapons qualification was also given.

Observations later received on the Okinawa invasion from the Commanding Officer of an Amphibious Truck Battalion with both AP&SC and other DUKW companies under his command, lauded the outstanding training received by AP&SC units and recommended that all DUKW companies and personnel operating in the Pacific should receive the benefit of training at the Waimanalo School. As a result of observations made during this operation, a device known as the "beach rack" was developed for performing maintenance on amphibious vehicles.

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Samples of furniture made by AP&SC Furniture Factory

Furniture Factory

With the establishment of numerous rear bases in the wake of advancing armies pushing closer to the heart of the Japanese Empire, requests and requisitions began to reach the Command for all types of furniture to comfortably equip officers and enlisted men's quarters, recreation clubs, etc.

The manufacture of utility furniture, such as desks, chairs and filing cabinets, had hitherto been accomplished by the U. S. Engineer Department which operated both a mill and an upholstery section for this purpose.

On 7 May 1945, the responsibility for the manufacture of all furniture was transferred to AP&SC. A new factory on Sand Island was constructed and equipment obtained to supplement that which was transferred from the Engineers along with the mill and upholstery facilities. Commencing operations on 25 May, the factory has, since that time, maintained a monthly average of 1344 pieces of furniture, including chairs, tables, bureaus, beds, lamps, chiffoniers, punees, etc., in addition to all types of office furniture.

With the introduction of this unit, the U. S. Army in the Middle Pacific Area was made entirely self supporting in regard to furnishing its widespread installations. At the same time, effective and profitable utilization of Italian and Japanese prisoner of war labor was made. Under civilian supervision, approximately sixty prisoners of war have been constantly employed in the production of this low cost, yet serviceable and decorative furniture.

Since the end of the war in August 1945, and the conversion of military posts to peacetime status, the factory has supplied furnishings for family quarters on posts, camps and stations, not only on Oahu, but also in forward areas under Middle Pacific jurisdiction.

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Crane Operators' School

Amphibious assault operations in the Pacific had emphasized the need for seasoned crane operators to handle the vast amount of supplies and fighting equipment necessary to the initial stages of each invasion. Scores of heavy lifts, guns, tanks, dozers, trucks and vehicles of every description, listed for priority discharge, had to be placed on the beaches to sustain the first phases of the landing operation.

In February 1945, to meet this demand relayed back from the landing beaches, AP&SC commenced the operation of a Crane Operators' School, operated on a 24-hour schedule by the Port Group at Camp Kalihi.

An intensive two-weeks course, with classes held both day and night kept two 8-ton Koehring Cranes in almost continual operation. A group of twenty men at a time, ten during daylight hours and ten at night, comprised each 14-day course, which included every phase of the operation and maintenance of a crane.

On completion of the two weeks course at Camp Kalihi, the men were taken to the Honolulu piers, where they operated 50-ton North-western cranes. Familiarization with ships' characteristics was also taught to the men by having them actually load and discharge heavy lifts of every type and description from ship to pier and vice versa.

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~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

VIII

June 1945 - June 1946

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

Preparation for the Invasion of Japan
and
Redeployment to Occupation Forces

When resistance ended on Okinawa in June 1945, months of intricate preparation and organization had already been completed towards a final dramatic stab at the heart of the Japanese Empire. But, with the loss of naval and air superiority, Japan had lost the means of supporting her armies and this, together with the introduction of the atomic bomb, brought hostilities to an unexpected and sudden end on 16 August 1946. Before the forces massing for the assault on the Japanese home islands had commenced loading, the enemy had surrendered unconditionally to the Allies and the battle of the Pacific was won.

The Command had been putting forth every effort to expedite the movement of personnel and supplies for the big push, but much of this anticipatory planning was easily diverted to the task of supporting the forces being sent forward to occupy enemy territory. At this time the 98th Division was in the final stages of training. Plans were revised to send it forward, but as an occupation force. The Division was quartered and trained at Fort Hase and its subposts of Pali and Heeia Camps. Garrison Forces No 457 and No 458 were also in the process of training at Schofield Barracks, but with the turn of events, they were no longer required.

Throughout the preparatory planning stages, the Command maintained liaison with participating Division units in all matters relative to services to be performed - packing, crating, palletizing, transportation, TQM and other training activities. During the loading phase, technical assistance was rendered by the Port Group, which assisted the TQMs in supervising and advising the inexperienced stevedores of the Division.

No units of the Command had been named specifically to accompany and support the assault troops, nor had individual training programs been set up. However, three combat loading courses and one garrison loading course were held at the TQM School for the benefit of the 98th Division. A total of 68 teams or 204 individuals received this instruction. The 9th Corps also

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trained additional TQMs in the school before its departure for the Philippines.


The TQM School was closed on 28 September 1945. Irrespective of its tremendously important mission, it was never allotted a sufficient number of grades and ratings, and, up until 15 August 1945, one month before its closing date, the only allotment received from higher headquarters, was one captaincy. In spite of this serious handicap, with its resultant effect on morale, a total of forty-one courses were conducted during the School's twenty-three month period of activation, with the assistance of detached service personnel.

As the need for training in amphibious and stevedoring operations no longer existed these schools were also closed out.

Although hostilities had ended, a tremendous job of work still faced Army Port and Service Command. The immediate separation from the service of thousands of overseas personnel falling within the Army Service Rating score qualifications, necessitated their processing and transportation homeward from the Middle Pacific Areas; nearly 18,000 troops destined for the occupation of Japan awaited shipment under the logistical coordination of AP&SC; supply lines to Pacific bases had still to be kept moving and the established functions of the Command continued in the gigantic transformation of the Army from war to peace.

On 10 August 1945, the second anniversary of AP&SC, a timely tribute was paid to its twenty-four months of supporting the fighting forces in the Pacific, from the Gilbert Islands to Japan's front door. The Meritorious Unit Service Plaque with two stars was presented to the 24th Major Port (Oversea) "for superior performance of exceptionally difficult tasks".

ORGANIZATION ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC AREA



Headquarters Army Forces Middle Pacific Area
Oct 1945

Approved

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON,
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S.A.

* This service to be commanded by Chief of Service


who also acts as Special Staff Officer

** Schofield Barracks re to direct to HQ MIDPAC

LEGEND
— COMMAND CHANNEL (DOWN)
- - - ROUTINE STAFF CHANNEL (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED)
FOR ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATION (UP)
COORDINATION (DOWN)
COOPERATION
INFORMATION

ORGANIZATION

ARMY PORT AND SERVICE COMMAND



Conclusion

HUSAFOA General Order No 13 established the U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific, on 30 June 1945 and all previously assigned organizations were transferred to the new Command. However, organization was not completed until 20 October 1945 when USAFMIDPAC General Order No 61 announced the discontinuance of the Central Pacific Base Command and the establishment of Army Port and Service Command as a major echelon.

During the remainder of 1945 and throughout 1946, the operation of Army Port and Service Command has continued with its responsibilities of supply, service and maintenance basically unchanged. The successful conclusion of the war obviated almost at once, the need for a number of Transportation Corps installations, but the rapid demobilization of troops also resulted in the inactivation of many specialized units. This lack of trained personnel caused the deterioration and loss of large quantities of supplies and equipment.

Reduction of personnel of course is related to reduction in operations and responsibilities. But, although the Command is carrying on with approximately 15% of its former strength, the work load has not decreased proportionately. As the repatriation of troops progresses, still further reductions will have to be made.

Commensurate with the reduction in personnel, the 24th Major Port (Oversea) was inactivated on 30 June 1946 and replaced by the 55th Medium Port (Oversea) established by USAFMIDPAC Administrative Order No 56, effective 20 June 1946.

Today, at a time when disunion and controversy are brewing in a troubled world, the future of Army Port and Service Command has still to be determined. Whatever its destiny may be, and until a decision is made, its reputation for service and efficiency, earned during the critical years of war, will be maintained throughout the ensuing years of peace.

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IX

ADDENDA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Civilian Personnel

HHD General Order No 120 which assigned the initial units to Army Port and Service Command on 10 August 1943, also transferred approximately 650 civilian employees of the Army Transport Division. This group formed the nucleus of the 3200 civilians under the jurisdiction of AP&SC's Civilian Personnel Division today.


The increase in the number of civilian employees was commensurate with the rapid growth of the Command. By November 1943, the total had climbed to 2100 with the addition of utility workers for maintenance service on posts, camps and stations. Clerical workers in all sections, stevedore and marine personnel, swelled this amount daily. In January 1944, five months after the inception of the Command, civilian personnel numbered 2350.

The administration of this expanding organization became the responsibility of the Civilian Personnel Branch operating as a subdivision of the G-1 Section of the Command. Its initial administrative strength of twenty in August 1943 had trebled in size by January of 1945, by which time the number of civilians had increased to 3506.

It was now obvious that the organizational growth of the Civilian Personnel Branch was such as to warrant its being made an individual echelon of the Command. On 23 July 1945, Civilian Personnel was established as a Division within AP&SC with the following branches: Administration, Classification, Employee Relations, Payroll, Recruitment and Placement, and Training. With this reorganization, operating procedures were completely revised and new War Department regulations enforced.

The introduction of a Classification Branch provided a basis for equitable rates of pay and evaluated accurately, the performance of employees.

A most noteworthy innovation was the Training Branch, through which the Command was able to achieve the maximum quantity and quality of production. On-the-job training programs enabled employees to fulfil their tasks more ably by practical instruction and simple demonstration.



An AP&SC Instructor conducting a "Training with Industry"
Class for Civilian employees.

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The Employee Relation Branch established a closer relationship between the supervisor and the employee by enabling grievances to be aired and adjustments made, resulting in a stable and productive work force being achieved.

More recently, a Placement Branch was set up to cope with the reconversion of military assignments to civilian positions. Qualifications of applicants are screened through this branch with a view to filling vacancies with the most suitable replacements.

In its assigned mission, the Civilian Personnel Division covered a wide field of activity. In addition to supervising the 983 graded positions in the Command, it controlled approximately 1000 marine employees who operated the sixteen oceangoing transports and forty-seven of the miscellaneous harbor craft under AP&SC control. With their civilian crews, this flotilla of miscellaneous vessels performed invaluable service for the Army during the war. With a total capacity of 22,000 measurement tons, AP&SC transports have maintained a continuous flow of men and materials throughout the Pacific Area; the twelve tugs operated by AP&SC's Harbor Craft Company have handled every type of ocean-going vessel on a 24-hour schedule; cargo and crane barges, J-boats and other floating equipment, manned wholly or in part by civilians, have all contributed their share to the vital work of keeping supplies moving to forward bases.

The Civilian Personnel Division has also been assigned the responsibility for personnel actions relating to crews of all Transportation Corps vessels entering the port of Honolulu. As this service covered the hire, release, transfer, promotion, demotion, repatriation, medical care and any necessary disciplinary action for all Transportation Corps ships' complements, a great deal of supervisory work and detailed compilation of records was involved.

With the end of the war and the consequent reduction in military personnel, the need for civilian replacements to carry on the activities of the Command has increased. A vast job of maintenance and further development of its wartime installations still faces the Army. Painters, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, mechanics, truck drivers, clerks and stenographers, are all needed to fill jobs left empty by servicemen returning to civilian life.

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As compared with 75 on V-J Day in August 1945, the administrative strength of Civilian Personnel Division, AP&SC, now numbers 115 and this group is rapidly becoming the central influence of a huge industrial organization. To maintain the essential operations of Army Port and Service Command, an estimated force of 3500 civilians will be necessary.

Congressional authority was granted to the War Department in 1944 to make appropriate non-monetary awards to civilian employees performing satisfactory, meritorious and exceptional services and, to date, eleven such awards have been made to AP&SC employees.

Security

As a sidelight to the employment of civilian workers for stevedoring and varying occupations in waterfront and restricted areas, the problem of security should be discussed. This was greatly complicated in the Hawaiian Islands by the presence of 165,000 Japanese (about one third of the stable population), both AJAs (Americans of Japanese ancestry) and Japanese aliens. This high percentage of aliens narrowed down the number of civilians available to relieve the critical stevedore and labor shortages.

Before the war, approximately 2500 Japanese of all categories were employed on the piers, but emergency wartime regulations prohibited their use in the handling of inflammable cargo, ammunition, or for control purposes. To screen applicants for work in restricted areas, a branch of AP&SC's Provost Marshal Office was established in the Office of the Military Governor. Working in conjunction with the Central Identification Bureau, this section set up an elaborate security system to classify, interview, fingerprint and photograph prospective employees and issue them with identification passes and badges. By the time the office closed in August 1945, an estimated 275,000 applicants of all types had been processed and 30,000 accepted as suitable for employment.

Subports

Territorial Harbors.— The control of all Army operations at subports of Territorial Harbors was assigned to Army Port and Service Command at its inception by HHD General Order No 110, 10 August 1943. This control embraced Army subports already established under the Hawaiian Department on the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, Maui and Molokai. Their mission was to discharge and load Army, Navy, Marine and commercial cargo; handle troop and passenger movements and, to perform all administrative details pertaining thereto.

The greater part of the tonnage handled at these subports was cargo in support of Army and Marine combat divisions brought from Oahu to outer islands of the Hawaiian Group for training, staging and finally, mounting for Pacific operations. Tonnage handled during the war period on the islands of Hawaii, Maui and Kauai, ranged from 10,000 measurement tons monthly to as much as 120,000 measurement tons at peak periods when large quantities of operational supplies were being moved. On Lanai and Molokai, an average of 2000 to 4000 tons monthly was maintained during the time these two subports were in operation.

Troop and passenger movements processed through the subports involved the handling of approximately 200,000 personnel.

A brief review of the location and activities of Territorial subports under AP&SC supervision, follows:

Hawaii. Hilo port is situated on the northeast coast of the island of Hawaii (largest of the Hawaiian Islands) about 190 miles southeast of Honolulu. Berthage for four oceangoing vessels is available, plus four ramps to handle LSTs. Practically all Army cargo handled on Hawaii during the war was processed through this port; however, during the period Marine units were in training, military cargo was sometimes handled through the cattle port of Kawaihae. Twelve gangs of commercial stevedores were at all times available, in addition to Army port companies which supplied as many as twenty gangs at peak times; Navy service units were also employed during combat moves. Aside from port companies, Army personnel numbered about forty, comprising military police, drivers and equipment operators. Although the tidal wave

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on 1 April 1946 completely wiped out the Army port installation at Hilo, reconstruction was effected.

Maui. The Army subport on Maui is located at Kahului harbor on the northern coast of the island and approximately 93 miles from Honolulu. Port facilities comprise four berths for average sized ocean going vessels. Throughout the war, eight commercial stevedoring gangs were available, although this number could be stepped up to twelve gangs by the use of Kahului railway employees. In January 1944, an AP&SC port company was sent to relieve the pressure caused by military movements.

Kauai. There are two subports on Kauai - Port Allen and Nawiliwili, both supervised from Elieli. Port Allen is on the south coast of Kauai about 107 miles from Honolulu and has two berths for two ocean going vessels. Nawiliwili is situated on the southeast coast about 99 miles from Honolulu. It also has two berths. Five commercial gangs were available to the two ports, which together have averaged approximately 7700 tons monthly.

Molokai & Lanai. As only small amounts of cargo moved to and from these two islands, the two ports were supervised by one subport commander. At Molokai, about 60 miles from Honolulu, cargo was handled at Kaunakakai, Kamalo and Kalaupapa harbors. At Lanai, the port primarily used was Kaumalapau.

Pacific Bases.- Army Port and Service Command port personnel was also utilized at most Mid-Pacific islands:

Canton Island. Located about 1660 miles south of Honolulu this island was strategically situated in the middle of the Pacific. For supply purposes, one port company (later reduced to one platoon) was maintained by AP&SC, plus a small quantity of materials handling equipment for the warehousing of supplies. Initially, as no port facilities existed, vessels were required to unload from ship to lighter. In 1944, however, the dredging of the channel to the lagoon was completed, providing fair harborage for one vessel. Since the withdrawal of port company personnel, the garrison commander has also acted as port commander.

Christmas Island. This island lies about 1161 miles southeast of Oahu. One AP&SC port platoon was furnished. No pier existed for handling large vessels and supplies were lightered ashore. The supply of the island included the British resident


R E S T R I C T E D

officials and the native labor recruited from other islands. In June of 1945, in order to supplement the reduced fresh food rations issued to troops stationed in the Hawaiian area, a deep sea fishing program, conducted on a recreational basis, was sponsored on Christmas Island by AP&SC. Approximately 1500 pounds of fish were shipped monthly to Oahu and distributed through the Quartermaster to units under CPBC. Responsibility for the support is now borne by the garrison commander.

Tarawa. Responsibility for the port serving Tarawa was assumed by CPBC on 1 June 1945 and Army Port and Service Command was directed to furnish one officer and 46 enlisted men to man this installation. This atoll, 2100 miles southwest of the Hawaiian Islands, had only one small pier unsuitable for anything but small harbor craft. Loading and discharging of the gasoline, oil, lubricants, subsistence and other garrison shipments was therefore accomplished by barge or LCM. From the time of its capture in 1943, Tarawa was operated as a Naval Base. However, command of the island was taken over by MIDPAC on 8 January 1946, at which time AP&SC was directed to continue the operation of port facilities.

Rapid demobilization at the end of the war with Japan necessitated the quick roll-up and near-abandonment of many Pacific island bases. However, garrison troops on many islands had still to be supplied and their logistical support was assumed by Army Port and Service Command in March 1946. This responsibility has expanded the transportation lanes of the Command by over 5000 miles, with round trips twice monthly by small FS (Freight Supply) vessels moving supplies to Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Tarawa, Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santos, New Caledonia, Aitutaki, Pago Pago, Christmas, Canton and the Line Islands.

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Cargo barge serviced by AP&SC as part of Harbor Craft Fleet.

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AP&SC Fleet

Floating equipment under the jurisdiction of Army Port and Service Command throughout the war period, covered a wide variety of water transportation and equipment, operated not only in the Honolulu Harbor and subports, but also at forward area ports and bases where AP&SC port personnel was maintained.

Functional responsibility for the maintenance, repair and supply of the 200 odd vessels assigned to the Command, was delegated to the Marine Branch of AP&SC's Army Transport Division. Included in this fleet were:

- 16 oceangoing cargo and passenger ships
- 38 FS (Freight Supply) vessels
- 6 miscellaneous small freighters
- 61 barges of all types (cargo, fuel, water, gasoline, crane, refrigerator)
- 23 harbor and seagoing tugs
- 63 motor launches and motor tow launches
- 11 cabin cruisers
- 4 radio control boats
- 7 sampans

USATs - U. S. Army Transports, run by and for the Army, have played an important part in the logistical scheme of supply peculiar to the Pacific Islands operations. By no means a modern fleet (the newest ship being over twenty years old), this flotilla of miscellaneous craft performed invaluable service by transporting men and materials throughout the Central Pacific Area. Prior to the war, most of these transports plied the Great Lakes, the West Coast and the Hawaiian Areas. Some were combination passenger and freight carrying ships, others solely cargo vessels; a few ran on inter-island routes. But, with their total carrying capacity of 60,000 measurement tons of cargo, these ships rendered valiant service in conquering the resupply problem of the Pacific Island bases.

The role played by AP&SC tugs has been no less important. These ranged in size from 40-90 feet in length and from 150/190 horsepower. Tugs owned and operated by Honolulu commercial firms were also used to supplement those owned by the Army and, to effect a maximum of efficiency in handling the great amount of activity

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in the Honolulu harbor, both commercial and Army tugs were placed in a central pool from which Army, Navy and commercial agencies drew, according to their needs. Every type of oceangoing vessel, from an LST to a luxury liner converted to a troop transport, was handled. Barges, carrying gasoline, fuel and supplies were towed all over the Pacific. In addition, the continuous shifting of barges within the Honolulu harbor, consumed many operational hours of the tugboat fleet. AP&SC Harbor craft maintained 24-hour operations and the extent of activities may be gauged by the fact that from May 1944 to April 1945, Army tugs in the Honolulu harbor alone were dispatched on more than 15,000 individual missions.

FS (Freight Supply) vessels proved of inestimable value in meeting problems which were encountered in the supply of the South Pacific. These ships, generally manned by three officers and 23 enlisted men, measured 176' 6" overall, with a 32' beam and a draft of 8' light and 10' loaded; gross tonnage was 556, net tonnage, 259. Due to their shallow draft, it was possible for these ships to offload their vital cargoes at ports which were inaccessible to larger ships, thus eliminating double handling into barges or lighters.

The ever present problem in the early days of the Pacific war, of supplying chill and freeze cargoes to forward areas, was also partially solved by the conversion (to specifications submitted to the War Department by AP&SC) of three of these FS vessels to 100% freezer purposes. Because of the great distances involved, the insufficient number of reefer ships available and, the inability of large ships to unload at small island ports, the supply of chill and freeze cargo to Army and Navy bases was always a headache. The use of FS vessels in this connection, greatly relieved the situation. Their successful employment prompted a high priority requisition for the conversion of an additional three ships and these six vessels have been continuously engaged in supplying the South Pacific with reefer cargoes since that time.

For the ferrying of military and civilian personnel within the Honolulu harbor, a fleet of J-boats (40-foot motor launches) was in constant use; other miscellaneous craft - crane barges, sampans, etc. have been effectively employed, perhaps less conspicuously, but nevertheless, with equal significance in the overall logistical plan.

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R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

One of the AP&SC Fleet of Tugs.

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Aerial View of Schofield Barracks



Posts, Camps and Stations

Control of all posts, camps and stations on Oahu, except those under the command of a Special Staff Section and the Air Force, was assigned to the Army Port and Service Command at its inception by HHD General Order No 110, 10 August 1943.

Although these installations were assigned with their complements of personnel and with tables of grades and ratings, any vacancies had to be filled from sources within AP&SC. As has been illustrated throughout this history, the shortage of personnel within the Command was a constant problem, there never being a sufficient number of replacements when qualified personnel were withdrawn for service in forward areas, special missions, and various other reasons.

As the original allotment to posts, camps and stations was continually being reduced, the mission of these units had to be carried on throughout the war and beyond, without their full authorized strength. The operation of Schofield Barracks is illustrative of this point, having the largest billeting capacity of any military post in the United States, accommodating 75,000 men at one time. During the period August 1943 to October 1945, it housed close to a million troops, operating with a complement of never more than twenty-one officers and 368 enlisted men.

The following is a brief outline of the history of posts, camps and stations, other than Sand Island, operated by Army Port and Service Command since August 1943:

Schofield Barracks.-

Largest of the nine posts under the jurisdiction of the Command and, before the war, the largest military post in the United States, Schofield Barracks was built thirty-six years ago on the Leilehua Plain, twenty-five miles northwest of Honolulu. It was named in 1909 for Lt General John M. Schofield of Civil War fame.

Once the site of a royal hunting preserve under the Hawaiian monarchy, its twenty-one square miles of terrain have comprised a vital staging and billeting area for troops being prepared for task

force operations further west. Its 6000 buildings can billet 75,000 troops normally and can accommodate another 10,000 in an emergency.

A 108-mile water system supplies the Post's 40 Post Exchanges; 20 Dispensaries; 50 Repair Shops; 3 Laundries; 9 Fire Stations; 1800 bed Hospital; 1½ million gallon swimming pool; and 3 sewage disposal plants, with a daily ration of 9-12 million gallons of water.

During the war, training areas on the main post were linked by eighty miles of roads with the Kaiaka LVT Camp; Kahuku Camp, and the Puniki, Mokuleia, Kawaihoa and Eucalyptus Forest Training Areas. Nineteen ranges afforded intensive training in all small arms, grenades, bazookas, machine and sub-machine guns and in infiltration, close combat and ranger work. Eight full time schools operated on the post, providing instruction in officer field training, aircraft recognition, swimming, motor maintenance, baking and cooking, oil burner operation, stenographic training and I&E educational and academic subjects.

Each technical service had a depot on the post, with warehouses totalling 1,830,000 square feet of storage space. For open storage 3.9 million square feet were available. The warehouses were served by highways and by 2½ miles of military railway.

With 24 buildings set aside for recreational purposes, Schofield's extensive facilities included 6 gymnasiums; a 10,000 seat boxing bowl; 25 athletic fields; 3 basketball and 40 volleyball courts; an 18-hole golf course; 7 indoor and 16 outdoor theaters; a roller skating rink; and 4 service clubs.

On 20 October 1945, Schofield Barracks was released from the control of AP&SC and now operates as a major echelon of USAFMIDPAC.

Fort Shafter.-

Second largest of the posts under AP&SC control and named for General Rufus Shafter who commanded U.S. Army forces invading Cuba in the Spanish American war, Fort Shafter was established in 1907. It lies at the foot of the Koolau mountain range about three miles northwest of the center of Honolulu city.

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MIDPAC Headquarters, Fort Shafter.

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Actually, the reservation's 1287 acres house four separate posts or commands: Fort Shafter; 147th General Hospital; Hawaiian Ordnance Depot; and the Signal Corps Area.

The major importance during the war of this post, whose famed palm circle of royal palm trees on the main parade ground make it one of the Army's most beautiful peacetime posts, is that it has contained the headquarters of U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific (formerly Hawaiian Department, Central Pacific Area and Pacific Ocean Area); Central Pacific Base Command (deactivated); Hawaiian Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command; and, the Seventh Fighter Wing.

Fort Shafter's 600 buildings house approximately 8000 officers and enlisted men. The largest structure on the post is the MIDPAC Headquarters, completed in June 1944, with 80,000 square feet of space and office accommodations for 300 officers, 700 enlisted men and 150 civilian employees. Storage facilities on the post embrace 253,901 square feet of space for general warehouse goods; 30,000 cubic feet for cold storage and 85,450 gallons for bulk petroleum. There are 11.60 miles of roads, 4 miles of water mains and 6 miles of sewer mains. Recreation facilities include a theater; 6 bowling alleys; a swimming pool; gymnasium; baseball diamond; 4 handball courts; 8 tennis courts and a 9-hole golf course. Training facilities included one rifle and one pistol range.

Fort Kamehameha.-

The main military post of Fort Kamehameha was established in 1909 as Fort Upton, and later redesignated in honor of the renowned first ruler of the Hawaiian Islands. Spreading $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles along the mouth of Pearl Harbor on the Waikiki side, it covers an area of 1500 acres. Groves of royal palms, coconut trees, banyans, date palms and flowering shrubs beautify the main post area.

Two sub-posts, Fort Weaver and Fort Barrette were established in 1922 and 1931 respectively. Fort Weaver covers $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of seacoast along the opposite side of the Pearl Harbor entrance on the Ewa side and Fort Barrette is located on a high hill adjacent to Ewa plantation and the Naval Air Station at Barber's Point.

Prior to coming under control of Army Port and Service Command Fort Kamehameha and its subposts were seacoast artillery posts assigned to the Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor. With the series

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of Pacific operations which have been initiated in the Hawaiian Islands, it grew tremendously in importance. With its many natural resources, such as accessibility to water, fire protection, railroad facilities, convenience to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu docks, this post served as a central supply point and regulating base for palletizing operations for seven Army divisions preparing for amphibious operations. As the flow of cargo for palletizing increased with each move westward, five large areas covering 2,000,000 square feet were continually in use.

When the post was first taken over by AP&SC, it housed a total of 4500 personnel. By March of 1945, the troop capacity was raised to 25,000 by improvisation of existing facilities, erection of temporary buildings, conversion of storerooms and improvements to utilities. Construction of the Fort Kamehameha Staging Area alone, stepped the billeting capacity up to 12,000 and in May 1944, the Camp Aiea Staging Area with a further capacity of 12,000 was also assigned to the post for administration.

In addition to the provision of billeting facilities for service units of infantry divisions preparing for operational moves, the post provided accommodations for Army Garrison forces assembling and training for the administrative and defensive control of islands yet to be captured. At the same time, Seacoast Artillery organizations and Anti-aircraft Artillery units protecting approaches to Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, and Naval Air Station, were housed. It is estimated that over a quarter of a million men were billeted and staged in the various post and subpost areas from August 1943 through January 1946.

In its housekeeping functions, the post was responsible for the repair and maintenance on construction and real estate amounting to over \$6,000,000 in value. In addition, it has been responsible for repair and maintenance in minor construction at 42 infantry beach positions, AAA field positions and fixed Seacoast Artillery installations grouped about Pearl Harbor.

Facilities of the post included 37 warehouses; 45 mess halls; 66 large barracks (capacity 4700); 108 family type quarters; 3000 tents (capacity 18,000); 9 miles railroad track; 23 miles roads; 78,000 gallons fuel storage; 50,000 square feet munition storage; 5,400,000 gallon sewer system (daily); 525,000 gallon capacity

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water tanks; 4,600,000 gallon capacity fire wells; 2 docks in Pearl Harbor channel with frontage of 250 linear feet; 549 numbered buildings; a rifle range with 24 targets. Recreational facilities include a well appointed enlisted men's service club; a theater with capacity of 550; bowling alleys and billiard parlor; gymnasium with seating capacity of 1200. In addition, the Army Personnel Center of Oahu and the Fire Fighter's School were located on the post.

Fort Ruger.-

Fort Ruger, situated on the southeastern edge of Oahu at the foot of Diamond Head has been a permanent Army post since 1909, being named for Major General Thomas H. Ruger who featured prominently in the Civil War.

Since the time the post was established, it has served as part of the coastal defenses of the Hawaiian Islands. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, considerable construction covering housing, defensive positions, storage and recreational facilities was under way and was hurriedly completed to strengthen the establishment.

The main post comprises an area of 714.904 acres, including the Diamond Head Crater. Immediately prior to being placed under control of AP&SC on 10 August 1943, an additional 111.088 acres were obtained near Koko Head for the purpose of establishing an Amphibious Training Camp. Although located several miles from the main post, this area was organized as a subpost and utilized for the training of amphibious units.

During the period August 1943 to February 1946, one of the main duties of Fort Ruger was the housing of the headquarters of the following installations: Central Pacific Base Command; Sea-coast Artillery Command; Artillery Command; Midpac Special Service Section; Midpac Fiscal Section; Midpac Exchange Office; 518th Quartermaster Car Company; 136th MRU; 270th Ordnance Maintenance Company; 139th Anti-aircraft Artillery Group and 392d AA Auto Weapons Battalion. This has involved the housing of approximately 5000 personnel, in addition to which 3000 personnel were billeted at Koko Head.

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The 23 warehouses situated on the post have stored thousands of tons of supplies and equipment for distribution as needed. In addition to maintaining the main post and the reservation at Koko Head, the Fort Ruger Utilities Section has maintained the utilities of military installations on the ocean frontage of the area between the Ala Wai Canal and the Koolau range.

Fort Armstrong.-

The present site of Fort Armstrong, originally known as "Emma's Wharf", was turned over to the War Department by the crown and government of Hawaii in 1899 and renamed in 1909 in honor of Brigadier General Samuel C. Armstrong. It is situated on the Kaakaukukui Reef in the Honolulu harbor.

The post covers an area of 86.272 acres and, curiously, more than half of this area is under water.

Along with other posts, camps and stations on Oahu, Fort Armstrong came under the jurisdiction of Army Port and Service Command on 10 August 1943. Since that time, it has provided headquarters for several units, notably the headquarters of the Midpac Engineer Service and the Prisoner of War Base Camp. A total of 2000 personnel have been housed on the post during this period.

Facilities include: Utilities and motor repair shops; warehouses; laundry; bakery; 31 permanent barracks (capacity 590); officers quarters (capacity 31); fifteen family type quarters; recreational facilities include a theater and swimming pool.

Camp Malakole.-

Officially established by HHD General Order No 1, 9 January 1941, Camp Malakole derived its name from two Hawaiian words "mala" meaning a plowed field and "kole" meaning red. It is situated on the southwest shore of Oahu, 25 miles from Honolulu.

The original function of this post was to maintain gun and firing positions for the Coast and Anti-aircraft Artillery and, basically, it is still an anti-aircraft firing range. However,

since August 1943, when it came under the control of AP&SC, it has also been used as a staging and billeting area for troops preparing for operational moves. A total of 43,350 troops, comprising both Army and Marines, were billeted at this camp during the war months.

Covering an area of 108.13 acres, the Camp maintains an officers' club; NCO club; theater; service club; and library. The Commanding Officer is also responsible for the maintenance and supervision of the Waianae Amphibious Training Center; Makua Area; "Little Schofield Camp"; Kahe Point Training Area; and, Maile Landing Beach.

Fort Hase.-

Established in March 1942 as headquarters of the Harbor Defense at Kaneohe Bay, Fort Hase was named in honor of the late Major General William T. Hase, a former chief of Coast Artillery. The ninth and newest post to be constructed on Oahu, Fort Hase is located on the Ulapau peninsula, windward Oahu, where Hawaiian mythology attributes the creation of the first man by the three gods, Kane, Ku and Lono.

Although originally intended to garrison from one to two battalions only, since the day it was placed under control of AP&SC it has provided billets for approximately 64,000 troops from Army divisions which have figured in Pacific offensives. The post offered training facilities in all phases of modern warfare, providing amphibious training at Waimanalo; jungle training at Kaawa and Punaluu; tank obstacle courses at Iolakaa Valley and Waiahole Area; and all types of modern arms and weapons, field artillery pieces and assault methods at Pali Training Camp and Heeia Training Area.

Comprising 860.9 acres of land, the post area has adequate billeting and storage facilities, its structures being of theater of operations type. In the war period it controlled 61 mess halls; 192 kitchens; 1236 barracks; 4828 tent floors; 111 warehouses and storage sheds; 60 administration buildings; 30 recreation buildings; 11 dispensaries; 16 repair shops; 9 post offices; 4 cold storages; a 1000-man laundry; 2 ice plants and 7 chlorination units. There were also three prisoner of war compounds in the area and a post utilities force of 102 civilian employees.

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Fort DeRussy Recreational Center

As Fort Hase was not a permanent military post before the war and its construction was an emergency defense measure, its post-war employment has yet to be determined.

Fort DeRussy.-

Named in honor of Brevet Brigadier General Rene E. DeRussy who served with distinction in the war of 1812 and the Civil War, Fort DeRussy became a military post in 1909 operating as a Seacoast Artillery Command. It is located at Kalia Road, Waikiki, near the south east corner of the Island of Oahu.

Assigned to control of Army Port and Service Command on 10 August 1943, its main duty throughout the war has been to provide rest and recreational facilities for personnel in the Middle Pacific Area. The biggest recreation center on Oahu, with clubs for both officers and enlisted men, its beach front and central locality have made it exceptionally popular. The overnight accommodations for 380 enlisted men and, since August 1945, 109 officers, are always filled to capacity.

Beach attractions include a swimming pier, diving boards, pontoons and a slippery slide; showers and locker rooms are provided. The Club DeRussy for officers, built over the blue waters of Waikiki, has sun decks and a dance floor. Rates are 50¢ per day for enlisted men, including meals, and \$2.00 per day for officers, not including meals. 140,000 enlisted men have been overnight guests and 2,602 officers.

The administration and supply of other recreational installations controlled by AP&SC is also a duty of Fort DeRussy and handled by the Morale Division of the Command, with headquarters on the post.

Additional responsibilities during the war were the training of enlisted personnel; provision of quarters for officers and enlisted men; and the storage of supplies, materials and equipment. Approximately 2500 personnel were housed on the post in addition to recreational personnel accommodated.



Front Entrance to the Haleiwa Officers' Club.

Recreational Facilities

In addition to the responsibility for the operation of recreational facilities located on posts under its command, Army Port and Service Command assumed operative control of all Army Recreation Centers located on the island of Oahu on 1 April 1945. These centers, operated almost exclusively by Army personnel, provided both officers and enlisted men with the means of getting away from the routine of Army life. (Unless otherwise stipulated, figures quoted below cover only the period under AP&SC - since 1 April 1945.)

Halekai Army Officers' Club.-

Situated at Waikiki, this popular beach club offered facilities for officers and their guests. Sandwich and cocktail bars were available. By the time it closed on 15 March 1946, the club had accommodated 50,000 guests in the 11-month period.

Army Bath House.-

Also located at Waikiki, this installation offered dressing room and shower facilities for male enlisted personnel, a small fee being charged for locker and towel. Approximately 40,000 personnel, Army and Navy, took advantage of its facilities.

Haleiwa Army Officers' Club.-

Resort style accommodations were here available for forty officers (Army and Navy) on leave. Beach, dining room, dance floor and lounge bar were open to transient officers. A honeymoon cottage on the riverbank was a novel feature. Prevailing rates were \$2.00 per day, not including meals. Approximately 42,000 officers were entertained during the above period.

Willard Inn.-

The central locality of the Willard Inn, situated at Waikiki, added to its other attractions which included an excellent cuisine and an open air patio and dance floor. Overnight

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Cooke Estate

accommodations for forty officers at the rate of \$2.00 per day were also available. An estimated 65,000 officers were catered for.

Cooke Estate.-

Originally opened in September 1945 to provide rest and recreation facilities for members of the Women's Army Corps and the Army Nurse Corps, this center was more recently made available to officers of the Waves, to the Red Cross, Army hostesses, librarians and a limited number of key female civilian employees of major echelons of Middle Pacific. Located at Laie, in pleasant surroundings, the Cooke Estate offered many attractions including bicycling, tennis, swimming and dancing. Overnight accommodations for twenty female personnel were available and transportation from several points in the city was provided for houseguests. Male guests were permitted from 1400 to 2200. Rates were \$3.00 per day and included meals. When the Cooke Estate closed on 14 April 1946, it had provided accommodations for 2500 guests in its eight months of operation.

Service Staff Officers' Recreation Center.-

In the luxurious surroundings of the Doris Duke Cromwell Estate at Diamond Head, general officers and colonels were permitted the use of the garden and swimming pool. Overnight accommodations were not available but a limited bar service was provided. Some 2300 officers availed themselves of this center

Waialae Golf Course.-

Facilities of this course at Kahala were made available to officers and enlisted men of the Armed forces daily, except Wednesday, Saturday, Sunday afternoons and holidays. Locker rooms and shower facilities were provided and also clubs. Fees were \$1.50 for eighteen holes. The club reverted to civilian use on 15 March 1946, having provided entertainment for some 20,000 Armed Forces personnel.

Maluhia.-

Located at Fort DeRussy, the Maluhia Recreation Center is open to both Army and Navy enlisted men. It consists of beer

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garden, dance hall, Post Exchange and library. This beautiful club is available to units for private parties; holds three dances weekly with games and USO shows on other evenings. It also contains a lounge for the playing of classical recordings. Approximately 1,100,000 enlisted men have received the benefit of this installation.

Miscellaneous.-

The Morale Division, AP&SC, also organized fishing trips; tours around the island; speedboat trips; vacations to the Kilauea Military Camp on the island of Hawaii; and other organized recreation for both transient troops and personnel stationed on Oahu.

It also had to cope with the problem of the entertainment of thousands of troops aboard transports passing through Honolulu on their way forward or homeward. During 1945, after V-E Day, with the redeployment of troops to the Pacific and the return of high-point men from overseas, this operation alone involved as many as twenty to thirty thousand troops weekly. In the period 1 November 1944 through 24 October 1945, 329 troop transports containing 502,710 personnel were entertained at the piers. USO shows, hula dancing and band music were provided; magazines, newspapers and games distributed; and, when possible outings organized.

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The GI Chorus

Distinctive among the varied types of recreation provided for enlisted personnel was the GI Chorus, established in February 1945 under the auspices of the Commanding General, AP&SC.

The organization of this choral group offered a means of off-time recreation for any GI from the air, ground or service forces, with a voice for music and an eye to locating the best expression for his talent while overseas. Originally planned as a recreational avocation only, and thought of in rather modest terms, the Chorus soon proved to be top-notch entertainment, with a demand for its services from both civilian and military audiences. The enthusiastic responses from both service personnel and the general public at these performances led to the planning of a series of concerts; the possibility of a tour of forward Army bases was also a project. However, the end of the war with the resultant readjustment and deployment program, depleted the original membership and precluded the fulfilment of some of these plans.

In December 1945, to surmount the many difficulties encountered in arranging practice hours for men from units all over Oahu, and to maintain the high musical standard already attained, permission was obtained from the Commanding General, Middle Pacific, to place GI Chorus personnel on Detached Service. Barracks at Fort DeRussy were set aside for their use and regular military duties gave place to musical study.

Representative of all parts of the United States, membership in the Chorus varied from 63 to 23. Over 100 personal appearances were made and approximately 15 radio broadcasts presented. Its repertoire included the best in secular as well as sacred and choral music.

Despite a struggle to maintain its personnel, the Chorus has always endeavored to present the best in musical entertainment with the talent available and, during its twenty month period of existence, has contributed greatly to the morale factor in the entertainment problem of troops overseas, most of whom deeply appreciated this type of musical presentation by their comrades in arms.

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GI Chorus practicing at St Andrew's Cathedral

15 OCT 1944

The Chorus has appeared before Army audiences at all posts, camps and stations on the island of Oahu; at Navy and Army hospitals; at theaters and civic gatherings. It has made several appearances at the Honolulu Academy of Arts and has twice visited the island of Hawaii. It was one of the chorus of five hundred voices invited to sing the "Messiah" during Christmas week, 1945, under the direction of the conductor of the Honolulu Symphony Orchestra. On Christmas Eve also, it made an eight hour tour of all hospitals on Oahu; all officers' and enlisted men's clubs, singing Christmas carols.

Climaxing its recent season, a concert was presented by the Chorus at the Mabel Smythe Auditorium - one of the most ambitious public appearances yet attempted.

Directed by and composed entirely of enlisted men, the GI Chorus has provided an outlet, not only for relaxation and recreation, but also for talents which might otherwise have remained latent. Much has been contributed towards the cultural entertainment of service personnel and residents of Honolulu and outlying islands, by the generous performances of these singing GIs.

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UNIT HISTORY

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Unit History

| Attached or Assigned | Unit | Relieved or Inactiv. |
|----------------------|--|---|
| 10 August 1943 | 197th Port Co, TC 443d Port Co, TC 439th Port Co, TC 441st Port Co, TC 458th Port Co, TC 440th Port Co, TC 724th MP Bn Hq & Hq Det, Ft Armstrong Hq & Hq Det, Ft DeRussy Hq & Hq Det, Ft Hase Hq & Hq Det, Ft Kamehameha Hq & Hq Det, Ft Ruger Hq & Hq Det, Ft Armstrong Hq & Hq Det, Camp Malakole Hq & Hq Det, Schofield Brks. | 3 January 1946 " " " " " " " " " 2 December 1944 " " " 6 March 1946 Active " " " " " " " 20 October 1945 |
| 23 November 1943 | 199th Port Co, TC 198th Port Co, TC 538th Port Co, TC 539th Port Co, TC | 3 January 1946 23 May 1944 21 April 1944 23 May 1944 |
| 3 December 1943 | 102d Infantry Div. Co "E" | 3 June 1945 |
| 8 December 1943 | 203d Port Co, TC 204th Port Co, TC 206th Port Co, TC | 2 January 1945 8 March 1945 8 March 1945 |
| 16 December 1943 | 477th Amphib. Trk Co. | 9 September 1944 |
| 24 December 1943 | 504th Port Bn, Hq & Det. 291st Port Co, TC 292d Port Co, TC 293d Port Co, TC 200th Port Co, TC 201st Port Co, TC 290th Port Co, TC | 15 February 1945 " " " " " " " " " 2 January 1945 25 February 1945 17 December 1944 |
| 10 January 1944 | 286th AGF Band | 25 January 1946 |
| 6 February 1944 | 1st QM Bn (Mob), Hq & Hq Det | 6 April 1945 |

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| Attached or Assigned | Unit | Relieved or Inactiv. |
|----------------------|--|---|
| 7 February 1944 | 480th Amphib. Trk Co 481st Amphib. Trk Co | 9 September 1944 " " " |
| 17 February 1944 | 510th Port Bn, Hq & Hq Det 310th Port Co, TC 311th Port Co, TC | 2 December 1944 14 May 1944 23 May 1944 |
| 2 March 1944 | 166th TC Boat Crew 167th TC Boat Crew | 18 September 1945 " " " |
| 13 March 1944 | 331st Harbor Craft Co | 3 January 1946 |
| 3 April 1944 | 312th Port Co, TC | 23 May 1944 |
| 13 April 1944 | 24th Port TC, Hq & Hq Det | 30 June 1946 |
| 14 April 1944 | Sand Island Mil. Res. | Active |
| 15 April 1944 | Co "C", 111th Inf. | 3 December 1944 |
| 22 April 1944 | 4217th QM Sv Co | 26 February 1945 |
| 12 May 1944 | 213th AGF Band | 30 November 1945 |
| 7 June 1944 | 364th Port Bn, Hq & Hq Det 363d Port Bn, Hq & Hq Det | 23 May 1945 26 February 1945 |
| 11 July 1944 | 848th Port Co, TC | 3 January 1946 |
| 13 July 1944 | 195th Port Co, TC | 3 January 1946 |
| 15 July 1944 | 371st TC Harbor Craft Co | 15 January 1946 |
| 21 July 1944 | 555th MP Escort Guard Co | 25 April 1946 |
| 26 July 1944 | 576th Port Co, TC 590th Port Co, TC 591st Port Co, TC Hq& Hq Det (Prov) APO 455 | Active 23 October 1944 " " " Active |
| 20 August 1944 | 3763d QM Trk Co 3764th QM Trk Co | 30 May 1946 13 April 1946 |

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| Attached or Assigned | Unit | Relieved or Inactiv. |
|----------------------|--|--|
| 22 August 1944 | 111th Inf. Co "B" | 3 December 1944 |
| 30 August 1944 | 3762d QM Trk Co 3761st QM Trk Co 474th QM Bn (Mob) | 27 December 1945 6 March 1945 4 February 1945 |
| 4 September 1944 | 592d Port Co, TC 551st MP Escort Guard Co 466th MP Escort Guard Co 471st Amphib Trk Co 474th Amphib Trk Co 475th Amphib Trk Co 476th Amphib Trk Co | 3 May 1945 28 June 1946 28 June 1946 16 November 1944 " " " 27 November 1944 " " " |
| 11 September 1944 | Fire Fighters' School Transport Quartermaster Schl Midpac Motor School | Active 7 September 1945 11 September 1946 |
| 23 September 1944 | 325th Med Det 326th Med Det 327th Med Det 328th Med Det | Active " " " |
| 3 October 1944 | 631st MP Escort Guard Co Casual Depot (CPBC) | 30 April 1946 14 June 1945 |
| 11 October 1944 | Hq & Hq Co 3d Bn, 102nd Inf | 2 January 1945 |
| 17 October 1944 | 481st MP Escort Guard Co | 28 June 1946 |
| 27 October 1944 | 162d MP POW Processing Co | 30 May 1946 |
| 7 November 1944 | 372d Port Bn, Hq & Hq Det | 3 January 1946 |
| 20 November 1944 | 4207th QM Sv Co | 22 November 1944 |
| 22 November 1944 | 39th CIS | 19 December 1944 |
| 23 November 1944 | 165th TC Boat Crew | 18 September 1945 |
| 27 November 1944 | 42d Amphib Trk Bn, TC Hq & Hq Det, 43d Amphib Trk Bn | 26 February 1945 9 February 1945 |

| <u>Attached or Assigned</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>Relieved or Inactiv.</u> |
|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 14 May 1945 | 527th Port Bn 404th PCA Pers. Center | 31 January 1945 4 September 1945 |
| 17 May 1945 | 372d Inf, Co "L" | 18 February 1946 |
| 23 May 1945 | 174th TC Boat Crew, Cl A 372d Inf, Co "I" | 30 May 1946 16 January 1946 |
| 30 May 1945 | 320th AA Bln Bn (VLA) | 4 December 1945 |
| 2 June 1945 | 968th CIC Det | 19 December 1945 |
| 6 June 1945 | 264th AGF Band 414th POA Prov TC Sv Bn | Active 27 June 1945 |
| 7 June 1945 | 161st TC Boat Crew Cl A 163d TC Boat Crew Cl A | 30 May 1946 " " " |
| 10 June 1945 | 114th Port Co, TC | 29 June 1945 |
| 13 June 1945 | 71st Amphib Trk Co 72nd Amphib Trk Co | 12 July 1945 " " " |
| 15 June 1945 | 857th Port Co, TC 872d Port Co, TC 115th Port Co, TC | 16 April 1946 " " " 16 August 1945 |
| 19 June 1945 | 268th AGF Band | 30 November 1945 |
| 21 June 1945 | 762d MP Bn Cos "A", "B", "C", "D" 32d TC Sv Bn | Active 12 July 1945 |
| 8 July 1945 | 372d Inf AT Co | 16 January 1946 |
| 18 July 1945 | CPBC Pers Center CPBC Disposition Center CPBC Separation Center CPBC Reception Center | 4 September 1945 " " " " " " " " " |
| 22 July 1945 | 361st Harbor Craft Co 873d Port Co (PR) 625th QM Sv. Co (PR) | Active 16 April 1946 15 January 1946 |

| <u>Assigned or Attached</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>Relieved or Inactiv.</u> |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| 27 July 1945 | 143d CA Grp, Hq & Hq Btry | |
| 31 July 1945 | 199th Fin Disb Section | 3 December 1945 |
| 6 August 1945 | 372d Inf, Co "K" | 16 January 1946 |
| 15 August 1945 | Hq & Hq Det, POW Base Camp | Active |
| 17 August 1945 | 363d MP Co (ZI) | 25 February 1946 |
| 25 August 1945 | 338th APO Unit 402d CIC Det 404th CIC Det | Active 31 August 1945 " " " |
| 26 August 1945 | 2219th TQM Team | 31 August 1945 |
| 8 September 1945 | 808th QM Sv Co | 15 January 1946 |
| 15 October 1945 | 811th QM Trk Co 525th QM Trk Co 522d QM Trk Co (PR) | 15 January 1946 3 January 1946 " " " |
| 2 November 1945 | Oahu Transportation Sv | 1 July 1946 |
| 19 November 1945 | 332d APO Unit Type "F" | Active |
| 3 December 1945 | 955th APO Unit Type "E" 956th APO Unit Type "E" 958th APO Unit Type "K" 954th APO Unit Type "D" 950th APO Unit Type "B" 963d APO Unit Type "A" 952d APO Unit Type "E" 138th QM Bn (Mob) 325th QM Bn (Mob) 141st QM Bn (Mob) 307th Med Det 893d QM Trk Co 4113th QM Trk Co 15th QM Truck Co 392d QM Trk Co | Active Active Active Active 11 April 1946 15 April 1946 Active Active Active 14 January 1946 Active 5 June 1946 15 May 1946 Active Active |

| <u>Attached or Assigned</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>Relieved or Inactiv.</u> |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| 3 December 1945 | 4250th QM Trk Co 3763d QM Trk Co 3764th QM Trk Co 521st QM Trk Co 16th QM Trk Co 376th QM Trk Co 4549th QM Sv Co 4550th QM Sv Co 4590th QM Sv Co 4579th QM Sv Co 364th MP Co 518th QM Car Co 226th AGF Band 111th AGF Band 286th AGF Band 239th Misc Fin Det 300th Fin Disb Section | 15 May 1946 30 May 1946 13 April 1946 " " " 30 May 1946 28 June 1946 28 February 1946 " " " 28 June 1946 28 June 1946 30 June 1946 " " " 20 January 1946 30 June 1946 25 January 1946 7 February 1946 " " " |
| 15 December 1945 | Command Vehicle Insp Team Roadside Spot Check Team | 12 September 1946 " " " |
| 28 December 1945 | 386th QM Trk Co (Hvy) | Active |
| 24 January 1946 | 268th Fin Disb Section Central Records Depot #3 | Active Active |
| 6 March 1946 | 283d AGF Band | 31 May 1946 |
| 13 March 1946 | 162d TC Boat Crew 166th TC Boat Crew | 16 August 1946 " " " |
| 16 April 1946 | 3714th QM Trk Co | Active |
| 17 April 1946 | 3452d QM Trk Co | Active |
| 22 April 1946 | 750th AA Gun Bn | Active |
| 21 May 1946 | 81st QM Dep Sup Co 3d Plt | Active |
| 23 May 1946 | 55th Medium Port, Hq & Hq Co | Active |
| 4 June 1946 | 83d QM Dep Sup Co, 2d Plt | Active |
| 25 June 1946 | 38th Port Marine | Active |



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